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On the Alienability of Legal Claims
by Michael Abramowicz*
Courts have become increasingly skeptical about rules restricting plaintiffs’ ability to
sell legal claims, and legal commentators have argued that markets for claims would
be efficient, moving claims to those who can prosecute them most efficiently. Claim
sales intuitively might appear to present a clash of economic and philosophical
arguments, with perceived efficiency benefits coming at the expense of societal
commitments to values other than efficiency. In this Article, Professor Abramowicz
argues that economic and philosophical arguments do point in opposite directions,
but in the reverse directions from what one might expect. A range of philosophical
and other noneconomic considerations, such as concerns about commodification,
corrective justice, legal ethics, and procedural justice, pose no significant problems
for claim sales. There is, however, a significant economic problem. Markets for legal
claims face a particularly strong adverse selection effect, because a prospective
purchaser must consider not only why the plaintiff wishes to dispose of the claim, but
also why the plaintiff cannot obtain a better deal from the defendant. Thus, even a
regime permitting alienation might result in very few claim sales, and many of those
may be motivated by prospective inefficiencies, such as attempts to manipulate the
path of legal doctrine. If, however, in some legal context plaintiffs managed to
overcome this adverse selection problem, so that claim sales became the norm, the
economic concern would be eliminated. But philosophical concerns would reemerge,
as this Article shows by using a hypothetical mandatory alienation regime as a
heuristic device.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a number of legal commentators have argued against restraints on the
alienation of legal claims. 1 A regime without such restraints would permit plaintiffs to sell their
claims to third parties, effectively allowing the transfer of litigation risk from plaintiffs to
others. 2 Courts increasingly have tolerated claim sales and have begun to view restraints on
alienation skeptically. 3 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, for example, concluded in
1997 that it would no longer recognize the common law doctrines of barratry, maintenance, and
champerty, 4 which prohibited, respectively, a stranger to a controversy from inciting litigation,
assisting in prosecuting litigation, or agreeing to take over litigation. 5 These doctrines

1

See, e.g., Peter Charles Choharis, A Comprehensive Market Strategy for Tort Reform, 12 YALE J. ON REG . 435 (1995)
(describing how permitting a market in tort claims could achieve some of the goals of tort reform movements); Susan Lorde
Martin, Syndicated Lawsuits: Illegal Champerty or New Business Opportunity?, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 485 (1992) (arguing for
permitting claim sales except in certain circumstances, such as where they might lead to harassment of a defendant); Marc A.
Shukastis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 329 (1987) (arguing that plaintiffs should be allowed to
sell personal injury claims); Paul Bond, Comment, Making Champerty Work: An Invitation to State Action, 150 U. PA . L. REV.
1297 (2002) (urging the legalization of champerty, subject to regulatory oversight and to certain exceptions); Ari Dobner,
Comment, Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA . L. RE V. 1529 (1996) (offering economic and fairness arguments in support of claim
sales); Teal E. Luthy, Comment, Assigning Common Law Claims for Fraud, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1001 (1998) (arguing that fraud
claims should be alienable).
2
The most radical of these proposals would allow plaintiffs to sell unmatured tort claims for wrongs that have not yet occurred.
See Robert Cooter, Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 VA . L. RE V. 383 (1989). Cooter’s insight is that markets for
unmatured tort claims could produce in effect no-fault insurance. The sale of rights to unmatured claims could constitute at least
partial consideration for the purchase of insurance, and in the event such a claim matured, the insurer could waive the right to the
claim in exchange for payment from the potential defendant. See, e.g., id. at 384 (“[S]uppose that drivers sell some of their rights
to recover for tortious automobile accidents to their own insurance company, [which] waives these rights in exchange for
payment from the insurance companies of other drivers. This series of private agreements would create a regime of no-fault auto
insurance.”). Cooter’s article focuses on matured rather than unmatured tort claims. For criticisms of Cooter’s proposal, see
Steven P. Croley, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785,
1810 (1995); Charles J. Goetz, Commentary on ‘Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims’: Collateral Implications, 75 VA .
L. REV. 413 (1989); and Alan Schwartz, Commentary on ‘Towards a Market In Unmatured Tort Claims’: A Long Way Yet to Go,
75 VA . L. RE V. 423, 423-24 (1989).
3
For a review of litigation trends, see Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Plaintiffs’ Lawsuits: An Increasingly Popular (and Legal)
Business, 33 U. M ICH . J.L. REF. 57 (1999-2000).
4
Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1224 (Mass. 1997).
5
The classic article discussing these doctrines is Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CAL . L. REV. 48 (1935).
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collectively form one of two legal obstacles to the development of legal claims markets. 6 The
second obstacle is a refusal by some courts to enforce contracts purporting to sell choses in
action, 7 especially for those that, if not assigned, would not survive the death of their original
owners. 8 Courts have generally shown more willingness to allow assignment of contract claims
than of tort claims, 9 and within the latter category of claims, more willing to allow assignment of
property damage claims than of claims for personal injury. 10
Businesses devoted to purchasing and prosecuting claims remain legally problematic, at
best. 11 Even in the Massachusetts case abolishing the common law prohibitions, the court noted
mysteriously in dicta that its decision would not legalize “the syndication of lawsuits.”12 New
Jersey is another state that has no bar on champerty, 13 but there, tort claims are not assignable. 14
In Texas, the state that has perhaps gone furthest to allow claim sales, legal claims are generally
assignable 15 and the doctrine of champerty has been abolished, 16 but barratry remains a criminal
offense, 17 and the courts have found that certain classes of cases, such as malpractice, 18 are not
6

Although champerty may be enforced criminally, some courts have allowed defendants to raise the defense that a claim was
champertously assigned, in effect using champerty doctrine to void assignments. See generally L.S. Tellier, Annotation,
Assertion of Defense of Champerty in Action by Champertous Assignee, 22 A.L.R.2D 1000 (1952).
7
See, e.g., Tiernan v. Jackson, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 580, 597 (1831) (“The general principle of law is, that choses in action are not at
law assignable.”). The common law prohibited assignment of any legal claim, but equity traditionally allowed assignment of
contractual claims. See, e.g., Kansas Midland R. Co. v. Brehm, 39 P. 690 (Kan. 1895). The rules in many jurisdictions have
loosened considerably, especially in contract cases. See, e.g., Bouchard v. People’s Bank, 594 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1991) (allowing
assignment of a chose in action).
8
See generally R.D. Hursh, Annotation, Assignability of Claim for Personal Injury or Death, 40 A.L.R.2D 500 § 2 (1955 &
Supp. 2000) (summarizing the rule and citing cases). For an example of a survival statute, see T ENN . CODE ANN . § 20-5-102
(West Supp. 2002) (providing that all civil actions, “except actions for wrongs affecting the character of the plaintiff,” shall
survive the plaintiff’s death).
9
See W.W. Allen, Annotation, Validity of Anti-Assignment Clause in Contract, 37 A.L.R.2D 1251 (1954 & Supp. 2000).
10
See W.W. Allen, Annotation, Assignability of Claim in Tort for Damage to Personal Property, 57 A.L.R.2D 603 § 4 (1958 &
Supp. 2000).
11
For a survey of the current status of champerty law in all of the states, see Bond, supra note 1, at 1333-41.
12
Saladini, 687 N.E.2d at 1227 n.7. Martin suggests that this dicta may mean that “it is permissible for one person, like Saladini,
or one business entity to support someone else’s lawsuit, but it may not be permissible for a group, i.e., a syndicate, to do the
same thing.” Martin, supra note 3, at 61. A slightly different interpretation would be that the court reserves the right to prevent
the operation of a business devoted to purchasing legal claims, in contrast to a situation in which a particular business buys a
single claim.
13
See Bouvier v. Baltimore & N.Y. Ry., 51 A. 781, 784 (N.J. 1902). For more recent sources, see Dobner, supra note 1, at 1549
n.93.
14
See N.J. STAT. ANN . § 2A:25-1 (2000) (making contractual choses in action only assignable).
15
See T EX. PROPERTY CODE . ANN . § 12.014(a) (Vernon 2001) (“[A]n interest in a cause of action on which suit has been filed
may be sold, regardless of whether the judgment or cause of action is assignable in law or equity, if the transfer is in writing.”);
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Jinkins, 739 S.W.2d 19, 22 (Tex. 1987).
16
See, e.g., Perry v. Smith, 231 S.W. 340, 341 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1921).
17
T EX. PENAL CODE ANN . § 38.12(a)(1) (West 2002) (making it an offense to “knowingly institute[] a suit or claim that the
person has not been authorized to pursue”); see also Medlock v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 24 S.W.3d 865 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana, 2000) (upholding discipline against an attorney accused of barratry). Medlock involved a lawyer who solicited
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assignable. There is no apparent political lobby agitating for increasing alienation of claims, and
the future of alienability is thus uncertain. This Article’s purpose is not to predict whether
alienation will become more commonplace, but rather to consider the normative question of
whether legal claims generally should be alienable. Many of the arguments, however, turn out to
depend, in part, on such a prediction. If alienation of claims is relatively rare in a particular
jurisdiction, moral and other noneconomic considerations should not pose barriers to sales of
claims, but the economic considerations are closer. If, by contrast, alienation were widespread,
claim sales would pose little economic danger, but noneconomic objections might become more
serious.
The existing literature on sales of claims relies primarily on economics, yet it might
intuitively seem that while allowing claim sales would promote efficiency, it would be
problematic on philosophical or other noneconomic grounds. Many people at least have this
intuition about other surprising proposals for market ordering: Deregulating the adoption market
might improve the ability of prospective adoptive parents and birth mothers to arrange
transactions that are both mutually beneficial and likely to improve the babies’ welfare, 19 but
such sales might commodify parent-child bonds. 20 I will argue, however, that this intuition is
backward when applied to the occasional sale of legal claims.
As long as claim sales are voluntary, they should not serve to further commodify the legal
system, even if we accept the standard account of commodification theory. A principal concern
of commodification theory is that commodification by some in effect will produce
commodification among all, with a single baby sale, for example, diminishing the value of all
parental relationships. Claim sales, at least on a modest scale, would likely have the opposite
business from a recent accident victim. It is not clear whether the Texas courts would uphold a barratry finding against a lawyer
who engaged in similar conduct but offered to purchase a claim instead of to serve as a lawyer.
18
See Vinson & Elkins v. Moran, 946 S.W.2d 381, 393-94 (Tex App.—Houston 1997, writ dismissed by agreement) (explaining
the public policy grounds for the exception, emphasizing “the personal nature of the attorney -client relationship, and the
confidentiality of that relationship”). Some courts in other states have restricted assignment of malpractice claims to parties who
were adversaries in the underlying litigation. See, e.g., Picadilly, Inc. v. Raikos, 582 N.E.2d 338 (Ind. 1991). Texas has a related
bar, preventing an alleged tortfeasor from accepting assignment of plaintiff’s claim against a joint tortfeasor as part of a
settlement with the plaintiff. See International Proteins Corp. v. Ralston-Purina Co., 744 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex. 1988).
19
See, e.g., Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978).
Landes and Posner are cautious about the implications of their analysis, suggesting only “the possibility of taking some tentative
and reversible steps toward a free baby market.” Id. at 347. The Article has often incorrectly been identified as allowing a “free
market” in babies. For a more recent view by Judge Posner on the regulation of the adoption market, see Richard A. Posner, The
Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. RE V. 59 (1987).
20
See, e.g., Neil Duxbury, Law, Markets and Valuation, 61 BROOK . L. RE V. 657, 685-86 (1995); Margaret Jane Radin,
Reflections on Objectification, 65 S. CAL . L. REV. 341, 349-51 (1991).
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effect, if any at all, by making claims not sold seem less motivated by financial concerns.
Similarly, the voluntariness of claim sales helps to insulate them against other noneconomic
attacks. Corrective justice, for example, is not offended by alienation, either by plaintiffs of their
entitlements or by defendants of their obligations, because the means by which tortfeasors rectify
the wrongful losses they impose is not important. If a plaintiff chooses to have a loss rectified in
the market, or a defendant pays another to take on a future liability, corrective justice would be
satisfied. Similarly, voluntary sales of claims do not violate either the rules or principles of legal
ethics, at least in the absence of a conflict of interest. Nor are voluntary sales of claims
psychologically problematic. While theories of procedural justice emphasize the importance of
control and participation in litigation, a voluntary decision to alienate a claim is no more
worrisome than a voluntary decision to settle one.
The economic balance, however, is more complicated. The economic theory of
alienability provides no case against permitting claim sales, and prior commentators have noted
several benefits. Most notably, claim sales can allow plaintiffs to obtain judgments more quickly,
and such sales can allow those who are most capable of handling the risks and challenges of a
litigation to do so. Claim sales, however, might well be rare because litigants’ information about
their own cases is likely to cause an adverse selection problem, and indeed the rarity of
retroactive liability insurance 21 for defendants suggests tha t even if permitted, only a few claim
sales may occur. That the market would not be robust might seem only to discount the potential
economic benefits of claim sales, but a market in which only a few claims are sold may be
problematic. Claims sold are not likely to be a random sample of all claims, and indeed those
claims sold may be among the most likely to present problems that will offset any efficiency
benefits that they provide. In particular, these claims may have disproportionately negative
effects on legal process, the development of precedent, and settlement.
The primary ambition of this Article is thus to flip the intuition that alienation of legal
claims is problematic philosophically, but not economically. It considers philosophical and other
noneconomic arguments related to claim sales in Part I, and the economic considerations related
21

Perhaps the most famous reverse insurance transaction involved the insuring of the 1980 MGM Grand Hotel fire, which killed
85 people. Although the insurance was purchased after the disaster, there was still intense litigation over the scope of the
insurance coverage. See Myrna Oliver, MGM Grand Set to Battle Its Insurers—Case Expected to Last 8 to 10 Months, Cost
$342,000 a Day to Try, L.A. T IMES, Mar. 18, 1985, at 1. The incident underscores that insurers who issue retroactive insurance
should wonder why the defendant seeks to purchase it. See infra Part II.C.1.
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to such sales in Part II. An additional thought experiment, however, involves imagining a world
in which claim sales are the norm rather than the exception, and Part III does this by considering
an extreme, a legal world with a mandatory alienation regime that requires parties to alienate
their claims. In this world, the intuition flips back. With everyone selling claims, the adverse
selection problem would disappear, as asymmetric information would not cause the market to
unravel. Noneconomic considerations, however, would reemerge, as claim sales would no longer
be voluntary. The question then becomes whether a market with pervasive, but not mandatory,
claims sales would sufficiently coerce litigants to alienate claims so as to present the same
difficulties.
I.

NONECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

This section considers four possible noneconomic justifications for opposing claim
sales—commodification theory, corrective justice, legal ethics, and procedural justice—and
rejects each in turn. While the first two of these are moral concerns, the third and fourth are
predominantly legal and psychological, respectively, though both of these theories have
philosophical underpinnings as well. Space limitations, of course, prevent full treatment of all the
disputes concerning the proper conception of each of these areas. My methodology is thus to
focus on the leading accounts of the relevant areas, with consideration of implications of variant
approaches restricted primarily to the footnotes. In applying the standard academic account of
these views, I do not intend to endorse these accounts or even to enter the debate about whether
these approaches are normatively superior to welfare econo mics. 22 The ultimate goal is simply to
show that, as traditionally formulated, the most formidable apparent objections to claim sales are
not powerful.
A. Commodification
It is both astonishing and revealing that no commentator appears to have considered
whether bars against transfer of legal claims cohere with other restraints on alienability, such as

22

For a comprehensive argument that welfare economics provides a better approach than “fairness” and related concerns for the
analysis of law, see Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. RE V. 961 (2001). For a response
from the author of one of the primary theories that will be applied here, see Jules Coleman, The Grounds of Welfare, 112 YALE
L.J. 1511 (2003) (reviewing the book version of the article, LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE
(2002)).
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rules preventing the sale of organs, children, and sexual services. 23 The small literature urging the
sale of legal claims conceives itself as connected to discussions of either tort reform or some
more narrow problems in particular areas of law. 24 Meanwhile, the philosophical literature on
inalienability and commodification does not explicitly discuss sales of legal claims. Yet, it is
hard to imagine an inalienability rule of more immediate relevance for the legal system than the
bar on selling most legal claims. The logical work to consider first in evaluating alienability is
that of Margaret Jane Radin, the most forceful proponent of inalienability for certain fo rms of
property. 25 Although Radin nowhere considers the alienability of legal claims, a brief review of
her analysis will allow for development of the strongest possible argument against alienation and
then a refutation of that argument.
While sympathetic to Marxist concerns that “people themselves, not just their
institutions, must change in order to live without the market,”26 Radin suggests that the Marxist
case is doomed by what she dubs the “problem of transition.”27 If the world is not now the
noncommodified ideal, then acquiescence to evolutionary decommodification may reinforce the
legitimacy of commodification more generally, 28 while an attempt at revolutionary
decommodification, i.e. the position that any decommodification that is possible should be

23

Two commentators come close. First, Marc Shukaitis considers briefly whether “there is something distasteful about buying or
selling personal injury tort claims.” Shukaitis, supra note 1, at 345. In a footnote, Shukaitis cites the inalienability literature, such
as it was at the time. Id. at 345 n.74. The concern that sale may be distasteful is an important one, and Shukaitis’s observation in
response to the concern, that “a market in tort claims may seem unnatural to many people simply because a market does not exist
now,” id. at 346, may be on the mark. Shukaitis, however, does not confront any other individual arguments in favor of
inalienability. Second, Adam Scales notes that Margaret Radin’s concerns about commodification might be relevant to assessing
the practice of settlement factoring, which is a form of claim alienation designed for tax purposes. See Adam F. Scales, Against
Settlement Factoring? The Market in Tort Claims Has Arrived, 2002 WIS. L. RE V. 859, 952-53, 57. Scales does not, however,
analyze whether Radin’s analysis condemns settlement factoring or claim sales more broadly.
24
See, e.g., Choharis, supra note 1, at 491-500 (suggesting that claim sales can serve an aggregation function and thus serve as
an alternative to class actions).
25
Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987) [hereinafter Radin, Market-Inalienability].
26
Id. at 1872 (citing Karl Marx, The German Ideology: Part I, in T HE M ARX-ENGELS READER 193 (R. Tucker 2d ed. 1984)).
27
Id. at 1875.
28
Radin explains:
The evolutionary approach harbors a transition problem because it does not address how we can progress toward
noncommodification using existing social structures and conceptual schemes that are thought to be artifacts of
commodification. Partial decommodification in the context of a continuing implicit commitment to a dominant market
order may mean that any deviations from the market order will only reinforce commodification, by being seen merely
as exceptions that prove the market rule.
Id. at 1875-76. Radin does not explain just how partial decommodification would be “exceptions that prove the market rule,” and
the assertion that changing the world by decommodifying a particular form of property could in effect increase commodification
seems strange. Perhaps Radin’s worry is again rhetorical, that those who seek partial decommodification are necessarily
conceding to the legitimacy of other commodifications. Yet, if proponents of partial decommodification emphasized that they
hoped to advance decommodification further, it is hard to see how a victory could be a defeat.
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attempted, “may wreak injustice.”29 Radin worries, however, that commodification may at times
be problematic. Radin critiques, for example, economists who “conceive[] of rape in terms of a
marriage and sex market,” because “market rhetoric conceives of bodily integrity as a fungible
object.”30 The problem with rape is not just that its cost is, with such high probability, likely to be
greater than its benefits as to justify an overinclusive ban on rape, 31 but that rape effectively
changes the nature of a person, for “[b]odily integrity is an attribute and not an object.”32 A
woman who is raped has not simply lost something compensable in dollars but has effectively
become a different person. 33 Market rhetoric “transforms our world of concrete persons … into a
world of disembodied, fungible, attribute-less entities possessing a wealth of alienable, severable
‘objects’” and thus “reduces the conception of a person to an abstract, fungible unit with no
individuating characteristics.”34
Thus, although in an ideal world, “market-inalienability would protect all things
important to personhood,” in our nonideal world, “it may sometimes be better to commodify
incompletely than not to commodify at all.”35 The public policy inquiry depends, first, on an
assessment of whether or not a particular form of property should be conceived of as important
to personhood, and if so, second, on an assessment of whether there are reasons to allow
alienability nonetheless. She asks rhetorically, “If some people wish to sell something that is
identifiably personal, why not let them?”36 Then, she offers three justifications: “a prophylactic
29

Id. at 1876.
Id. at 1880.
31
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 238 (5th ed. 1998) (“[S]ome rapists derive extra pleasure from the fact
that the woman has not consented. For these rapists, there is no market substitute . . . and it could be argued therefore that [rape]
should not be punished if the sum of satisfactions to the rapist . . . exceeds the victim’s pain and distress.”); see also RICHARD A.
POSNER, SEX AND REASON 365-71 (1995) (further developing Posner’s views on rape).
32
Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 25, at 1881.
33
Radin clarifies that “someone who is raped is [not] changed into a completely different person.” Id. at 1881 n.118. She argues,
“[W]e must have a way of conceptualizing our understanding both that she is different afterwards, so that we recognize that she
has been changed by the experience, and simultaneously that she is the same afterwards, or else there would be no ‘she’ that we
can recognize to have had the experience and been changed by it.” Id. This concession, while probably necessary, leaves a loose
thread in Radin’s argument. Radin’s argument that bodily integrity and money are incommensurable seems to flow from her
premise that no amount of money could compensate for a loss in bodily integrity, because the person who receives the money is
not the same as the person that originally existed. In other words, the person who was victimized is irretrievably lost and cannot
be recovered. This is an appealing argument, for the same reason that a baby killer cannot compensate by bringing a new child,
even a hypothetical one with the same genes, into the world. Once Radin admits that the victim’s underlying identity remains the
same, the question arises why changing one aspect of a person’s identity should be seen as fundamental.
34
Id. at 1885. Thus, Radin concludes, “universal market rhetoric does violence to our conception of human flourishing.” Id.
35
Id. at 1903.
36
Id. at 1909. The section containing and responding to this question is entitled “Methods of Justifying Market-Inalienabilities.”
Id. This orientation is perplexing, because it might seem that once we have determined that something is important to
personhood, the burden of justification should be on the advocate of alienability. Radin does address justifications for alienability
30
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argument, assimilation to prohibition, and a domino theory.”37 The prophylactic argument is that
the sale of an item of property integral to personhood might create a presumption that the sale is
coerced, even if it is theoretically possible for an uncoerced sale. 38 The prophylactic argument,
however, may be “deeply troubling,” for example, if the individual who wishes to alienate the
property is being coerced by poverty and “we then do not provide the would-be seller with the
goods she needs or the money she would have received.”39 The prohibition argument is simply
that there might be a “moral requirement” that a good, such as love, friendship, or sexuality, not
exist in a commodified form, for example because the commodification “creates and fosters an
inferior conception of human flourishing.”40 Finally, the domino theory is relevant where “the
commodified and noncommodified versions of some interactions cannot exist,” for example if
“the existence of some commodified sexual interactions will contaminate or infiltrate everyone’s
sexuality so that all sexual relationships will become commodified.”41
Though this is but a crude summary of Radin’s theory, it is sufficiently deep to allow
development, and then scrutiny, of a case for the inalienability of legal claims. Legal claims may
be important to personhood, because the possession of a legal claim may be constitutive of
identity. There is no shortage of tales of individuals who have fought hard to vindicate a position
in litigation, and not just for monetary return. Pursuing a litigation to its conclusion may be an
integral part of a healing process for those who perceive themselves to be victims of wrongs. The
possession of a legal claim may serve as a substitute for whatever is lost as a result of the wrong,
and if what is lost is not commensurable in money, then mere monetary compensation will not
serve as an acceptable substitute.

in the context of considering justifications for inalienability, so her approach to presentation does not technically affect the
validity of her argument. Nonetheless, it is interesting that Radin’s arguments themselves seem close to embracing market
rhetoric, or at least economic reasoning. Economists could classify each of the arguments she identifies as reflecting some sort of
market failure. This may suggest that Radin is not opposed to economic reasoning per se, only that she is opposed to the market
rhetoric that often accompanies such reasoning, but this interpretation would significantly dull her criticism of economic
arguments. See, e.g., supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing an economic argument that Radin seems to be criticizing
on the merits of the argument).
37
Id.
38
For example, “selling oneself into slavery [is] so destructive of personhood that we would readily presume all instances of it to
be coerced.” Id. at 1910.
39
Id. at 1910. “Thus, this aspect of liberal prophylactic pluralism is hypocritical without a large-scale redistribution of wealth and
power that seems highly improbable.” Id. at 1911.
40
Id. at 1912.
41
Id. at 1913.
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Moreover, the argument continues, each of the three arguments in favor of preventing
sale of property integral to personhood applies. The prophylactic argument applies because there
is a strong possibility that a plaintiff’s decision to sell a legal claim will be coerced. An initial
inability to obtain satisfactory legal representation, or immediate financial demands, for example,
may coerce a plaintiff to sell her legal claim In addition, the prohibition argument applies
because it is morally problematic that a plaintiff who sells a lega l claim is not merely selling
something that she owns, but is compromising the legal system itself. Finally, the domino theory
applies because, if legal claims are exchangeable like securities, they will be viewed in much the
same way as securities, rather than as representing moral claims against wrongdoers. Thus, the
sale by one plaintiff of a legal claim may contaminate the aspect of legal claims central to
personhood for everyone else. Sale of legal claims would inject market rhetoric into the legal
system, which would come to be seen as something little different from the Treasury or the
Social Security Administration, as a governmental body serving a fundamentally economic
function. This shift in the general view of the legal system inevitably would affect perceptions of
individual claims, and worse, of individuals holding such claims.
Some may already believe this argument to be made of straw, and although I have tried to
make it as sturdy as possible, I agree that it has substantial holes. Perhaps the most significant
objection is that a legal claim is an inherently transient form of property, lasting only as long as
the lawsuit. Even if there are litigants whose identities are tied up with their legal claims, there is
nothing the legal system can do for them, for the change to personhood will happen eventually.
Thus, if the personhood argument is to be salvaged, the means by which legal claims are
resolved must be integral to personhood. Perhaps the resolution of a legal claim in a court of law,
with a decision by a judge or jury, is critical to preserving personhood, because it is the promise
of judicial or jury decisionmaking that separates a legal claim from other contingent assets, such
as stocks which depend on individual companies’ economic performance. Courts, however, often
resolve claims pretrial, for example, on a motion to dismiss or through summary judgment, and
such dispositions are not reserved for frivolous claims. If the promise of judicial or jury
decisionmaking was a serious concern, our existing legal system would be in need of substantial
reform. Most seriously, the practice of settlement means that the vast majority of cases will not

ALIENABILITY OF LEGAL CLAIMS

12

be resolved by a court, but by the parties. Sale of a legal claim is presumably similar to
settlement, which is just a sale by the plaintiff to the defendant, in its effect on personhood.
Even if legal claims are important to personhood, the arguments that an individual should
not be allowed to trade off personhood for other goods are weak. The prophylactic argument is
weak, for the same reason that Radin concludes that laws banning prostitution are problematic.42
If litigants are coerced into selling claims, then the nature of the coercion is presumably
economic because sales of legal claims on the basis of other forms of coercion, such as physical
coercion, would presumably be invalidated under standard contract law principles. 43 A plaintiff
will always have the option of not pursuing a legal claim, so an inalienability rule may lead to
some litigants abandoning their claims without compensation. The prohibition argument, that
alienation of a claim may be immoral, hardly allows for easy analysis, though my consideration
below of corrective justice theory provides one way of conceptualizing this argument. 44
Finally, the domino theory—that “commodification for some means commodification for
all”45 —seems precisely backwards in the context of legal claims. Legal claims are already at
least partially commodified, 46 because even if the reason someone pursues a claim is not
financial, successful pursuit of a claim for money damages results in the transfer of money. If
some plaintiffs sell out, the plaintiffs who choose not to sell out will likely be seen as more
vigorous litigants and perhaps as more committed to obtaining a judgment in court. Moreover,
plaintiffs who do sell out might need to cooperate with purchasers in pursuing their claims, and
plaintiffs’ willingness to do so, despite the irrelevance of subsequent proceedings to them
personally, might suggest that they have a nonmonetary interest in the case. Similarly,
defendants who alienate their claims, and nonetheless vigorously defend themselves, may be
42

Radin calls this problem the “double bind.” She argues:
Often commodification is put forward as a solution to powerlessness or oppression, as in the suggestion that women be
permitted to sell sexual and reproductive services. But is women’s personhood injured by allowing or by disallowing
commodification of sex and reproduction? The argument that commodification empowers women is that recognition of
these alienable entitlements will enable a needy group—poor women—to improve their relatively powerless, oppressed
condition, an improvement that would be beneficial to personhood.
Id. at 1915-16. She ultimately concludes, “I think we should now decriminalize the sale of sexual services in order to protect poor
women from the degradation and danger either of the black market or of other occupations that seem to them less desirable.” Id.
at 1924.
43
See infra notes 278-280 and accompanying text (assessing the possibility that legal claim sales might be coerced).
44
See infra Part I.B.
45
Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 25, at 1917.
46
This contrasts, for example, to markets for babies, because babies are generally thought not to be commodified at all. Id. at
1925-26. Radin notes that while “[p]erhaps babies could be incompletely commodified, valued by the participants to the
interaction in a nonmarket way, even though money changed hands … it seems too risky in our nonideal world.” Id. at 1926.
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seen as doing so for other than financial reason alone. 47 The domino theory might make sense if
the ultimate goal of litigation was to receive an apology and no money from the defendant, and
some plaintiffs, somehow, were able to turn their claims into money, but the domino theory does
not make sense in a legal system, like ours, that is oriented towards money judgments rather than
apologies. 48
Even if there was an argument that the importance of legal claims to personhood might
justify the inalienability of some claims, the argument seems tenuous, even ridiculous, when
applied to all claims. To take an extreme, even though corporations in court on an issue of
contract law or even public law may claim to find support in significant moral and legal
principles, we all accept that, for the most part, corporations are seeking to maximize their own
welfare. 49 The assertion that a corporation’s legal claim might be important for personhood
seems far- fetched, or at least a description of the unusual, rather than the usual, case. Even when
venturing beyond corporations to lawsuits brought by or against individuals, many lawsuits,
personhood just isn’t supremely important for many cases that are the bread-and-butter of the
courts, and the recognition that courts may have important symbolic roles in human affairs
should not blind us to the reality that courts also serve a practical function that often is more
important. Thus, if any proposal to reform the courts is thought to endanger personhood, an
assessment should be made of the kinds of cases that the proposal would affect. Criminal and
quasi-criminal cases, for example, may be of greater import for personhood than insurance cases.
In sum, even accepting the philosophical argument that property may be important to
personhood and, therefore, that inalienability rules sometimes may be justified, this argument
does not apply convincingly to legal claims. My point, of course, is not that Radin is wrong, but
that even if she is correct, application of her framework to legal claims supports permitting
47

A defendant may defend its activities for reputational reasons, which in themselves might be financial, especially if the
defendant is a corporation. Interestingly, studies suggest that the civil cases against corporations can be as damaging to
corporations as criminal ones. See Michael K. Block, Optimal Penalties, Criminal Law and the Control of Corporate Behavior,
71 B.U. L. REV. 395, 414-15 (1991).
48
For an economic and evolutionary psychology analysis of whether the legal system should encourage apology, see Erin Ann
O’Hara & Douglas Yarn, On Apology and Consilience, 77 WASH . L. REV. 1121 (2002).
49
Some scholars have urged that corporations take into account constituencies other than shareholders, but there is broad
agreement as a positive matter that corporations generally seek to maximize shareholder value. See generally Lisa M. Fairfax,
Doing Well While Doing Good: Reassessing the Scope of Directors’ Fiduciary Obligations in For-Profit Corporations with NonShareholder Beneficiaries, 59 WASH . & LEE L. REV. 409 (2002) (considering the extent to which corporate law permits privatized
firms to make decisions that would benefit constituencies other than shareholders); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and
Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 T EX. L. REV. 579 (1992) (justifying statutes allowing
directors to consider interests other than wealth maximization and explaining how such statutes might be enforced).
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alienability if there is some reason other than personhood to do so. Indeed, I suspect that Radin
herself might agree with this analysis. Though Radin does not discuss legal claims directly, she
does discuss Richard Abel’s proposal for a tort system that would protect personhood by not
allowing damages for pain and suffering, which commodify the “unique experience” of
individuals. 50 Radin labels “the proposal troubling and its agenda unjust.”51 She explains, “To
deny money damages, inadequate though they may be, seems to compound the injury to tort
victims under the present social structure, in which we have not put into practice other measures
that would take care of them in better ways or prevent their injuries in the first place.”52
Similarly, if alienation of claims benefits plaintiffs (or defendants) without impairing the goals of
the legal system, then seeking to protect personhood may compound plaintiffs’ injuries (or
defendants’ claims of injuries) in the absence of a better system for addressing them.
B. Corrective Justice
The possibility that alienation of a legal claim offends personhood does not exhaust the
range of potential philosophical concerns about alienation of legal claims. Perhaps the most
obvious objection is that alienation of legal claims may offend corrective justice. 53 Though views
on the content of corrective justice vary, corrective justice is both a descriptive and a normative
theory of tort law, challenging the economic approach that emphasizes the minimization of all
forms of accident costs. 54 Alienation of legal claims might seem to offend corrective justice by
interfering with the relationship between plaintiffs and defendants. If a plaintiff alienates a legal
claim, the defendant may end up paying as a result of his actions, but the money paid will not go
the plaintiff. Similarly, and perhaps of greater concern, if a defendant alienates a legal claim, the
plaintiff may end up receiving money in a judgment or settlement, but the check will not be
written on the defendant’s account. Once either party alienates a legal claim, the connection
50

Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 25, at 1876 (citing Richard Abel, A Critique of American Tort Law, 8 BRITISH J. L. &
SOC’Y 199, 207 (1981)).
51
Id. at 1877.
52
Id.
53
Corrective justice theory springs from Aristotle’s analysis in Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics. For an exploration of the
Aristotelian conceptions, as well as an argument that the content of corrective justice is dependent on judicial practical wisdom,
see Mark C. Modak-Truran, Corrective Justice and the Revival of Judicial Virtue, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN . 249 (2000).
54
The classic statement of this position is GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970). Calabresi, however, allows for the possibility that justice may place requirements on the tort system apart from cost
minimization. See id. at 26 (“Apart from the requirements of justice, I take it as axiomatic that the principal function of accident
law is to reduce the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents.”).
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between the plaintiff and the defendant is severed. The question is whether this severance
offends corrective justice.
To answer this question, we must consider several possible conceptions of corrective
justice, because even theorists who are committed to corrective justice over the economic
approach have not agreed upon the content of corrective justice. The view that alienability need
not offend corrective justice may be seen most easily by adopting what Jules Coleman, the
leading philosopher of corrective justice, 55 has called the “a nnulment conception of corrective
justice.”56 Although Coleman himself has withdrawn his prior endorsement of this view, 57 some
other theorists continue to see it as more attractive than Coleman’s later approach, 58 and so it is a
useful starting point. Under the annulment view, corrective justice “specifies grounds of recovery
and liability; it does not specify a particular mode of rectification.”59 The annulment theory,
however, “gives no one in particular any special reason for acting, for annulling wrongful gains
or losses.”60 Thus, on this view, while a victim of a wrongful loss has a claim to repair, corrective
justice does not necessarily require that the wrongdoer who caused the loss rectify it. 61 Because
the annulment conception does not establish any special relationship between a wrongdoer and a
victim, alienability of legal claims does not offend it. 62

55

Cf. Ernest J. Weinrib, Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice, 2 T HEORETICAL INQ . IN L.
107, 126 (2001) (calling Coleman “the most prominent tort theorist to have adopted” the emerging consensus view on corrective
justice).
56
For an articulation of this view, see Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND . L.J. 349
(1992).
57
See JULES L. COLEMAN , RISKS AND WRONGS 306 (1992).
58
See, e.g., Matthew H. Kramer, Of Aristotle and Ice Cream Cones: Reflections on Jules Coleman’s Theory of Corrective
Justice, 16 QLR 279, 279-80 (1996).
59
COLEMAN , supra note 57, at 306.
60
Id. at 309.
61
The problem Coleman perceived in the annulment view is that corrective justice becomes indistinct from distributive justice.
Coleman explains:
Corrective and distributive justice are distinct principles of justice. That just means that typically they give individuals
different kinds of reasons for acting. But if we accept the annulment thesis, this is not how corrective and distributive
justice differ. For, as I have characterized it, the annulment view appears to hold that justice requires that a certain state
of the world be brought about, not that anyone in particular has a special reason in justice for bringing it about. And
this is precisely the way we think about distributive justice. Therefore, in terms of their reason-giving properties,
corrective justice is indistinguishable from distributive justice.
Id. at 310.
62
One step is needed to justify this conclusion. The annulment conception is not empty; it does require that “[w]rongful gains
and losses cannot be annulled so as to create other wrongful gains or losses.” Id. at 306. Thus, if alienation of legal claims leads
to new wrongful gains or losses, then it could offend corrective justice.
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Coleman currently subscribes to what he calls the “mixed conception of corrective
justice,”63 which combines the annulment conception with the relational conception of corrective
justice. The relational view, advocated by Ernest Weinrib, 64 focuses directly on the relationship
between a wrongdoer and a victim, and specifies “a framework of rights and responsibilities
between individuals”65 in order to restore equality between them. It thus seems that the relational
approach would provide a more promising route to assessing and problematizing alienability.
According to Coleman, however, the relational conception is incomplete, as “[t]he existence of a
loss is not necessary to trigger claims based on corrective justice, nor is the point or purpose of
corrective justice to annul or eliminate a loss.”66 The problem with the relational view, Coleman
argues, “is that it cannot take us from ‘repairing the wrong’ to ‘repairing the losses.’”67 Thus, if
Steven and Michelle both drive negligently, but only Steven’s negligence causes a car crash
injuring David, the relational conception by itself does not explain why Steven, but not Michelle,
should pay damages to David. 68 Though the relational account demands repairing of the wrong, it
cannot explain why the wrongdoer who causes an injury must pay damages, rather than, for
example, requiring that both wrongdoers “make a public statement conveying the judgment that
they were wrong to treat others as means to their ends.”69 The relational view, taken alone, thus
offers no challenge to alienability, for it does not specify how a wrong is to be repaired.
The mixed conception, however, corrects this limitation of the relational view and,
therefore, might seem to pose a more substantial objection to alienability. According to the
mixed conception, “the duty of wrongdoers in corrective justice is to repair the wrongful losses
for which they are responsible.”70 If the wrongdoer is the defendant, and the victim is the
63

Id. at 318-24; see also Jules L. Coleman, The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 427 (1992).
See Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL . U. L. REV. 485, 514-26 (1989); Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and
Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 407, 444-50 (1987).
65
COLEMAN , supra note 57, at 314.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 320.
68
See id. at 321-22.
69
Id. at 321.
70
Id. at 324. Coleman initially starts with a broader principle, including a duty to repair the wrong as well as a duty to repair the
wrongful loss: “Corrective justice imposes on wrongdoers the duty to repair their wrongs and the wrongful losses their
wrongdoing occasions.” Id. Coleman explains: “The duty to repair the wrong follows from the relational view; the importance of
wrongful losses to the demands of corrective justice is the remnant of the annulment view: thus, the ‘mixed’ view.” Id. Coleman,
however, then argues that the reparation of the wrong itself is the concern of retributive justice, not corrective justice. Id. at 325.
The mixed view in the final analysis is thus “mixed” not because it sums up the duties suggested by the annulment and relational
views, but because it combines the annulment view’s emphasis on wrongful losses with the relational view’s emphasis on the
connection between the wrongdoer and the victim.
64

ALIENABILITY OF LEGAL CLAIMS

17

plaintiff, then the alienation of a legal claim might seem to prevent the defendant from repairing
the wrongful loss suffered by the plaintiff. Instead, the defendant will simply pay off someone
who has already repaired the plaintiff’s wrongful loss, or a third party previously paid off by the
defendant will repair the plaintiff’s wrongful loss, depending on whose claim is alienated. Or, if
both claims are alienated, the culmination of the process will be one third party making a
payment to another. The question is what, once one accepts the mixed conception’s notion that
corrective justice imposes a duty on a wrongdoer to repair a loss, counts as fulfillment of the
duty to “repair.” Even with alienability, the wrongdoer pays and the victim receives, but the
repair is not direct.
Although Coleman does not define the word “repair,” he distinguishes the basis of a duty
to repair losses from “the permissible ways of implementing the duty.”71 In explaining this
distinction, Coleman offers a hypothetical in which Donald Trump “volunteers to pay all my
debts of repair.”72 If this occurs, “all claims against me are extinguished,”73 and corrective justice
is not violated. Corrective justice is not concerned with retribution against the decisio nmaker,74
but with wrongful losses, and if a third party decides to rectify a loss while absolving a
wrongdoer of responsibility, then there is no longer a loss for the wrongdoer to rectify. 75 Similar
logic explains Coleman’s conclusion that a social scheme of no- fault insurance need not violate
corrective justice. 76 It would not offend the mixed conception of corrective justice for a
71

Id. at 327.
Id. at 389; see also id. at 327-28 (“Therefore, it does not follow from the fact that one is required to make repair as a matter of
corrective justice that any institutional arrangement (or mode of rectification) that discharges that duty in some other way (for
example, through the general tax office) would be unjust.”).
73
Id.
74
Gerald Postema explains, “Retributive justice concerns the wrong, the wrongdoer’s culpability, and the appropriate response of
the public. Corrective justice focuses on the victim’s loss and the claim to repair for that loss; it is not concerned with punishing,
blaming, or exculpating the injurer, or with rectifying the wrong.” Gerald J. Postema, Risks, Wrongs, and Responsibility:
Coleman’s Liberal Theory of Commutative Justice, 103 YALE L.J. 861, 875 (1993). A plausible response is that even if it makes
sense to compartmentalize retributive justice from corrective justice for analytic purposes, it is no defense of a practice to
conclude that it violates retributive justice but not corrective justice. Nonetheless, while a full argument is beyond my scope here,
retributive justice seems much less relevant than corrective justice to alienability, because criminal law usually accommodates
the goals of retributive justice.
75
But see Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice, Liability for Risks, and Tort Law, 38 UCLA L. REV. 143, 144 (1990)
(arguing that the resources to compensate victims must come from the wrongdoers).
76
Coleman explains:
The New Zealand plan neither affronts corrective justice, nor is its existence irrelevant to corrective justice….
The reason [a victim who receives no-fault compensation] has no claim in corrective justice to repair is that there
exists some other mechanism through which the costs of accidents are to be allocated. That means that whether or not
corrective justice in fact imposes moral duties on particular individuals is conditional upon the existence of other
institutions for making good victims’ claims to repair. The capacity within a particular community of corrective justice
to impose the relevant moral duties depends on the existence of certain legal or political institutions or social practices.
72
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defendant to pay a third party to assume the responsibility for a wrongful loss allegedly caused
by the defendant. 77 At the same time, Coleman indicates that allowing those who have not
suffered wrongful losses to recover from defendants who have acted wrongfully is
unproblematic, for example, when the plaintiffs are effectively acting as private prosecutors. 78 If
it is permissible under corrective justice to rectify a wrong before the wrong has even occurred
by hiring a third party, then purchase by a third party of a plaintiff’s claim is surely permissible.
That alienability of legal claims does not offend Coleman’s mixed conceptio n of
corrective justice is also apparent from Coleman’s observation that “[i]mplementing corrective
justice requires a set of substantive liability rules” as well as “administrative rules establishing
burdens of proof and evidence.”79 Such rules “provide the best chance of practically
implementing corrective justice under less than ideal circumstances.”80 Even if corrective justice
imposes demands on the substantive content of tort law, it has little to say about the form of the
institutions used to achieve those substantive goals. Corrective justice does not, for example,
dictate whether judges should be given lifetime tenure, though it is possible that some
institutional arrangements might be better suited for implementation of corrective justice than
others. Neither permitting nor requiring alienation of legal claims is an institutional change that
is relevant to corrective justice. Consider an institution just like our current tort system, but in
which, after a judgment was rendered, the defendant was required to make a payment to the court
and the court made a payment to the plaintiff. Even if this made a difference in some cases, for
example by ensuring payment to victims of judgment-proof defendants, 81 it would not offend
COLEMAN , supra note 57, at 402; see also id. at 404 (“[A]lthough corrective justice is private justice—justice between the
parties—whether or not it imposes obligations between the parties depends on other social, political and legal practices.”).
Coleman originally assessed no-fault comp ensation in Jules L. Coleman, On the Moral Argument for the Fault System, 71 J.
PHIL. 473 (1974).
77
Nothing in Coleman’s hypothetical depends on Trump’s agreeing to assume the debt without compensation. Cf. COLEMAN,
supra note 57, at 402-04 (emphasizing that Trump’s action was voluntary, but not that it was taken without monetary or other
compensation).
78
Coleman hypothesizes a situation in which a manufacturer has failed to provide an optimal warning, but the particular victim
never read the warning and thus was not harmed by its imperfections. Even though the victim has no right in corrective justice to
compensation, a cause of action granting the victim compensation “provides him with an incentive to litigate” and “act[] as a
private regulator.” Id.at 387. For a broader assessment of who should pay for a victim’s loss according to corrective justice when
the wrongdoer cannot pay, see Kathryn R. Heidt, Corrective Justice from Aristotle to Second Order Liability: Who Should Pay
When the Culpable Cannot?, 47 WASH . & LEE L. RE V. 347 (1990).
79
Id. at 395.
80
Id. For an exploration of this aspect of Coleman’s theory, see Gerald J. Postema, Risks, Wrongs, and Responsibility:
Coleman’s Liberal Theory of Commutative Justice, 103 YALE L.J. 861, 883-86 (1993) (reviewing COLEMAN , supra).
81
Christopher Schroeder argues that the existence of judgment-proof defendants means that “[a]n effectively implemented
liability for risk system would extract many little payments from individuals rather than waiting for isolated large demands.”
Schroeder, supra note 75, at 475.
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corrective justice. A defendant wo uld still be fulfilling his duty to repair the plaintiff’s wrongful
losses within a particular institutional framework. A regime allowing alienability is similar in the
sense that the defendant does not make payment to the plaintiff directly. 82
I have based my conclusions that alienability is consistent with corrective justice on Jules
Coleman’s evaluation of corrective justice. This leaves my conclusion open to the objection that
alienability may be inconsistent with some other conception of corrective justice, 83 and that
conception may happen to be the correct one. 84 I could not eliminate this objection fully by
enumerating each conception of corrective justice, because it may be that no one has developed
the proper conception of corrective justice. Indeed, one response to the apparent compatibility of
corrective justice and inalienability would be to conclude that conceptions of corrective justice
should be modified to account for the intuition that alienation of claims violates corrective
justice. For examp le, Coleman might modify his conception by placing more emphasis on the
institutions implementing tort law, instead of focusing solely on the substantive content of that
law. 85 Nonetheless, that alienability is consistent with corrective justice as presently conceived at
least casts doubt on the possibility that our society has not allowed alienability because of
82

A difference is that alienability may allow a defendant to pay an amount that is different from the amount the plaintiff receives,
because of the uncertainty of judicial outcomes. Even in our existing system, however, the payment of attorneys’ fees means that
the defendant’s total expenditures on litigation will not all be in the form of an income transfer to the plaintiff. See, e.g., JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE AD HOC COMM. ON ASBESTOS LITIG., REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES AND M EMBERS OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 13 (Mar. 1991) (noting that legal expenses have dwarfed recoveries in the asbestos
context). A plaintiff who must pay a portion of an award to an attorney does not receive full compensation for a wrongful loss.
Whether alienability will make such gaps smaller or larger is a question of empirics and theory, but it is not a question of
relevance to corrective justice.
83
For example, Susan Randall’s approach to corrective justice emphasizes the fact-finding process and thus, if accepted, might
provide more powerful arguments against alienation. See Susan Randall, Corrective Justice and the Torts Process, 27 IND . L.
REV. 1 (1993). Similarly, Catharine Pierce Wells’s pragmatic account emphasizes the role of the jury. See Catharine Pierce
Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury Adjudication, 88 M ICH . L. REV. 2348, 2402-08 (1990).
84
Coleman argues that different conceptions of corrective justice are not all that different. “All viable accounts of corrective
justice, whatever their substantive disagreements are committed to the centrality of human agency, rectification, and
correlativity.” Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 15, 26 (1995). But see Matthew S.
O’Connell, Note, Correcting Corrective Justice: Unscrambling the Mixed Conception of Tort Law, 85 GEO . L.J. 1717, 1718
(1997) (“[T]here are vast differences among theories of corrective justice . . . .”). The only one of the concepts Coleman cites that
might seem relevant to whether a defendant must make a compensatory payment directly to a plaintiff is rectification. Yet I can
see nothing in any account of corrective justice that would distinguish that account from Coleman’s in such a way to make a
difference in this respect.
85
On the other hand, it might be that the existence of an institution permitting alienability of legal claims would itself change the
nature of corrective justice. Coleman concludes that although corrective justice’s content is objective, in that one account of
corrective justice may be more accurate than another account, corrective justice itself may “depend[] on human practices, beliefs
and evidence.” Coleman, supra note 84, at 22; see also id. at 22-23 (“For me, the content of corrective justice depends on the
practices in which it figures, but it is not fully fixed by how I or anyone else happens to regard it.”). Thus, even if it were the case
that alienability is inconsistent with corrective justice, as best currently conceived, allowing alienation of legal claims might be a
sufficiently significant change to contemporary practice that this institution might have ramifications for the practice of corrective
justice. But cf. id. at 24 (arguing that even if corrective justice is fixed by current practices, some current practices may be
inconsistent with corrective justice, because “truth outruns the practice”).
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concerns about corrective justice. The intuitions and judgments that philosophers believe explain
our tort practice generally do not seem to be related to alienability, let alone to condemn it.
C. Legal Ethics
Another objection to alienability is that it might change the role of the lawyer, from a
professional to a mere profit maximizer. The objector might concede that there is already much
in modern legal practice about which to despair, with profit motive a central element in the
organization of large law firms and in the prosecution of civil cases. 86 Allowing alienability,
however, would not just be an incremental shift toward profit maximization. Alienation of legal
claims would destroy the heart of the ethical rules by effectively eliminating the attorney-client
relationship. 87 Under current ethical rules, the attorney is at least obligated to confront her client
before making significant decisions, 88 and it is the agency relationship that distinguishes
attorneys from business executives who seek merely to advance their own personal interests.
Alienation of legal claims, however, would allow attorneys to own claims, thus freeing the
attorneys of the necessity of agency. In a world in which legal claims are mere commodities, it is
hard to see how attorneys could be anything but commodities as well.
The beginning of a reply is in the recognition that, placing aside bans on champerty and
maintenance, prosecution by an attorney of a suit in his own interests does not violate ethical
rules. That is, while it may be illegal for an attorney to purchase someone else’s tort claim, a
lawyer who is himself injured may bring a suit on his own behalf, just as an attorney, or anyone
else for that matter, may choose to defend himself in a criminal case. 89 Many ethical rules are
intended to ensure that an attorney act in a client’s interest, rather than in a self- interested way. 90
Eliminating the incentive incompatibility between a lawyer and a client is not an evasion of such
rules, but a satisfaction of them. Purchase of a claim by a lawyer forces the lawyer to internalize
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Even many who accept that profit is an important criterion in law firm decisionmaking urge that law firms also pay attention to
the value of “professionalism.” See, e.g., Edward S. Adams & Stuart Albert, Law Redesigns Law: Legal Principles as Principles
of Law Firm Organization, 51 RUTGERS L. RE V. 1133 (1999) (considering different approaches to managing “hybrid”
organizations like law firms that seek to maximize profit and also to pursue other objectives).
87
Some commentators are concerned that other developments, in particular the increasing provision of legal services without
face-to-face contact, might erode the attorney-client relationship. See, e.g., Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client Relationships in
Cyberspace: The Peril and the Promise, 49 DUKE L.J. 147 (1999).
88
See, e.g., M ODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a) (2002).
89
See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 814 (1975).
90
See, e.g., M ODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002) (prohibiting conflicts of interest with current clients).
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all the benefits and costs of resolving the claim. A lawyer in such a position will not work
unnecessarily hard to increase billable hours, and will not work too little because he has little
stake in the outcome. Thus, if the relevant ethical rules are seen as a mechanism for ensuring the
loyalty of lawyers to their clients, 91 once the purchase of a claim is completed, there can be little
concern that the ethical rules have been violated.
There are several potential objections to this line of reasoning. First, the argument is
predicated on the belief that lawyers who own a claim will act in their own interests. Though
consistent with economic theory, this assertion may well not be true. The old adage is that a
lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a client. 92 Being a good lawyer requires detachment,
and even someone who believes that he will benefit from purchasing a claim and prosecuting it
himself may turn out to be badly wrong. If the adage is true, perhaps there is an argument for
paternalism, 93 and inalienability is the paternalistic solution. The argument for paternalism,
however, seems weak, and not just because any disadvantage from lack of perspective is
balanced by the incentive alignment that claim purchases provide. The intuition behind the adage
is likely not that self- interest inherently clouds judgment. After all, all lawyers are presumably
self- interested, for example, because success in one case will bring some measure of fame and
fortune, and it seems hard to believe that the best lawyers are those who have the least at stake in
prosecuting their cases. Rather, the intuition is that a disinterested lawyer will be more attuned to
the litigation’s objective and less concerned with peripheral issues such as vindication or
reputation. Peripheral issues, of course, would not affect someone who owns a claim arising
from events in which she had no stake. Thus, a lawyer who purchases from a stranger a claim for
money damages may not be a fool to prosecute it herself.
Second, even if it is ethically acceptable for a lawyer to prosecute a claim once she has
purchased it, the purchase itself may be problematic. The purchase will be particularly
problematic if a lawyer purchases a claim from his own client, or perhaps from an unrepresented
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M any commentators urge that ethical rules seek to make lawyers more than mere hired guns. See T HOMAS L. SHAFFER &
ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND M ORAL RESPONSIBILITY 15-29 (1994) (discussing and critiquing the “lawyer
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See, e.g., Faretta, 422 U.S. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Behavioral economists, who consider theories that economic actors may not always be rational profit-maximizers, do not view
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person, because the client may infer wrongly that the lawyer is giving disinterested legal advice
when in fact the lawyer is acting in her own interests. This argument seems to be overstated, at
least absent fraud. Even a relatively unintelligent layperson would recognize the possibility that a
lawyer seeking to purchase a claim, no less than a driver seeking to purchase a car, might be
taking advantage of him. Perhaps self- awareness would not be sufficient to prevent abuse, 94 and
whether self-dealing is successful or not, the practice of lawyers engaging in it could hurt the
reputation of the profession. 95 The law, though, has an easy solution for such situations: requiring
independent representation. 96 More drastically, one might prevent lawyers from purchasing
claims, or at least from purchasing claims that they plan to prosecute or defend themselves. In
such a regime, one could purchase a claim and have one’s own lawyer prosecute it, thus allowing
the benefits of moving claims to relatively risk-averse parties without necessarily eliminating
agency costs. My point is not that such a regime should be adopted, 97 but that if concerns about
shysters are sufficiently weighty, there are potentially effective solutions.
Third, the ethical rules may be concerned not only with clients, but also with the integrity
of the courts. Lawyers who are prosecuting their own claims might have a greater incentive to
commit a fraud upon the court, for example by fabricating evidence, or less dramatically by
seeking to misrepresent it. The ethical rules provide incentives for lawyers to act honestly, but
these incentives are balanced by opportunity for financial and reputational gain. Increasing the
amount at stake for attorneys in a given suit may well increase attorneys’ incentive to perform
well, as argued above, but it may do so too much. Greater rewards make the potential risks less
weighty in the moral decisionmaking process. 98 The problem with this argument is that if these
94

One argument is that tort victims may apply a high discount rate and thus accept low offers for claims. Luthy responds to this
criticism by arguing that “[i]f the victim believes the value of his expected judgment decreases by a certain percentage for each
additional day that he has to wait for it, he should be free to act accordingly.” Luthy, supra note 1, at 1015. An additional
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willing to pay the most for claims.
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It is not clear, however, that the increasingly commercial orientation of law firms is responsible for the low reputation of the
profession. One commentator has argued that decreasing elitism and the ascent of postmodern thought are responsible. See
Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Professionalism in the Postmodern Age: Its Death, Attempts at Resuscitation, and Alternate Sources of
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supra note 1, at 445; see also Luthy, supra note 1, at 1020 (considering this argument).
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A separate argument is that lawyers may have reduced moral scruples in a regime that allows alienation of legal claims. It is
hard to see, however, why this should be. Perhaps an alienability regime, by commodifying legal claims, makes money seem all
the more important.
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are the concerns of the legal system, then the legal system should be quite different from how it
is now. Perhaps there should be rules preventing lawyers from being overly invested in any one
case, 99 but there are not. Moreover, perhaps we should prevent lawyers from bringing cases on
their own behalf, but we do not. The danger of fraud seems at least as likely in a case in which a
lawyer is interested both personally and financially as in a case in which only dollars are at issue.
One might argue that the rule is responsive to an adverse selection problem, 100 that lawyers who
buy claims are disproportionately likely to be bad apples. Yet there seems little reason that
purchasers of legal claims should have worse ethics than anyone else, 101 and if they did,
alienability might make unethical lawyers easier to identify and to police.
Fourth, alienability may offend legal ethics precepts, not because alienation of claims will
lead to abuses, but because the attorney-client relationship itself has benefits. In The Lost
Lawyer,102 Anthony Kronman rejects a purely instrumental view of the attorney’s role. 103 The
ideal lawyer is a “lawyer-statesman,”104 and such lawyers “agree that their responsibilities to a
client go beyond the preliminary clarification of his goals and include helping him to make a
deliberatively wise choice among them.”105 Even accepting this argument, however, alienability
of legal claims need not be inconsistent with it. Clients, after all, hire lawyers not just as
litigators, but also, more broadly, as counselors. Clients may continue to rely on lawyers to
99

This might be difficult to do, but one way to approximate this effect would be to encourage large law firms to make each
lawyer’s welfare depends on a diversified portfolio of cases. If anything, however, large law firms are generally seen as more of a
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See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing adverse selection in claims markets).
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The best argument might be that fraud is easier to accomplish when working alone than when working with a client, because
of the danger that the client will have moral qualms about misrepresentation by a lawyer. At least with respect to minor
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102
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Kronman characterizes his view of an attorney’s role as follows:
The narrow view insists that a lawyer is merely a specialized tool for effecting his client’s desires. It assumes that the
client comes to his lawyer with a fixed objective in mind. The lawyer then has two, and only two responsibilities: first,
to supply his client with information concerning the legal consequences of his actions, and second, to implement
whatever decision the client makes, so long as it is lawful. The client, by contrast, does all of the real deliberating. He
decides what the goal shall be, and whether it is worth pursuing given the legal costs his lawyer has identified.
Id. at 123.
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Kronman adopts this phrase from an article written by Chief Justice William Rehnquist. See William H. Rehnquist, The
Lawyer-Statesman in American History, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL ’Y 537 (1986).
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KRONMAN, supra note 102, at 129. Kronman later adds that lawyers are useful not only in counseling impetuous clients, but
also in advising clients who may not know their own goals. “In many cases, it is only through a process of joint deliberation, in
which the lawyer imaginatively assumes his client’s position and with sympathetic detachment begins to examine the alternatives
for himself, that the necessary understanding can emerge.” Id. at 133.
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obtain advice, including advice about whether to sell a legal claim, and such advice might reflect
both financial and other considerations. Of course, clients might not hire lawyers for such advice,
but clients also may choose, in the present system, to hire lawyers who will not help them
deliberate; after all, Kronman believes that the modern lawyer is “lost,”106 perhaps ir revocably
so.107 Alienation of legal claims may reduce the time period in which clients engage with their
attorneys, just as the settlement of a case means that the parties will no longer have opportunity
to seek the advice of their lawyers about the case. Clients’ and lawyers’ failure to usefully
deliberate together, however, is no more traceable to alienation than any lack of deliberation
today is traceable to settlement.
D. Procedural Justice
Accuracy and cost are not the only relevant considerations in the design of a legal system.
Also relevant is whether litigants are satisfied with the process, an evaluation that may depend in
part on factors like accuracy and cost, but also may depend on whether the litigants perceive the
system as fair. Psychologists John Thibaut and Laurens Walker were the first to recognize the
independence of what they called “procedural justice” from traditional considerations of
accuracy and cost, 108 and legal scholars like Jerry Mashaw have argued that adjudicative systems
should take into account the “dignitary” interests of participants. 109 Though scholars have not
articulated how much of a tradeoff between dignitary values and accuracy is tolerable, 110 if
procedural justice is an important part of the balance, an alienation regime might at first glance
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While Kronman does not reject the possibility that the decline of the lawyer-statesman is a demand-side phenomenon, he
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prospects of the lawyer-statesman, at least given Kronman’s despairing conclusion that it is “highly unlikely that the country’s
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L. M ASHAW , DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 169-218 (1985); Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The
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(1976).
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As Colin Diver notes, the dignitary values that Mashaw identifies are not “self-defining” or “sufficiently robust to withstand
attack from the encroaching welfare state without reinforcement from some ‘prudential’ argument that requires courts somehow
to balance a set of fuzzily-specified secondary values.” Colin S. Diver, 94 YALE L.J. 1529, 1534 (1985) (reviewing M ASHAW ,
DUE PROCESS, supra note 109). As Mashaw himself has noted, “[t]o rethink participatory process rights in terms that make them
meaningful at the level of self-definition or in terms of the desire for community may be, necessarily, to make them
nonjusticiable.” M ASHAW , DUE PROCESS, supra note 109, at 180.
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appear problematic. After all, an alienability regime presumably reduces the percentage of cases
that are resolved by trial- like procedures, 111 and if such procedures are the paradigm of what
litigants view as respecting their dignity, then sales of claims would come at the expense of
procedural justice. Because alienation is voluntary, the loss of procedural justice is presumably
worth it to the alienator, but procedural justice nevertheless appears to be something that is
sacrificed by alienation.
The argument that alienation offends procedural justice, however, assumes that only triallike procedures can produce feelings of procedural justice. The justness of the market for claims,
however, must be independently evaluated. 112 Many markets, after all, are seen by participants as
procedurally fair. When I buy a used car, I may be suspicious of the seller, and I may even end
up concluding that I got a bad deal, an accuracy concern, but I am unlikely to conclude that the
system was procedurally unsatisfactory. One can imagine other systems for distributing used
cars—for example, a governmental agency that assigns used cars to the individuals whom such
cars will most benefit—yet I would conjecture that such a system would result in participants’
sensing less procedural justice than they do in the present system. By itself, this cannot be an
argument that sales of legal claims would maximize procedural justice. Perhaps markets will
maximize procedural justice for certain types of transactions, and governmental entities, like
courts, will do so for other types of transactions. The analogy emphasizes, however, that a
mandatory alienation regime would not simply eliminate a process in order to produce
procedural justice, rather such a regime would replace the present process with a new process,
and the procedural justice merits of the new process would need to be evaluated and compared
with those of the existing system.
A conclusive assessment of whether alienation produces more or less procedural justice
than the present system demands an empirical analysis, but an analysis of the procedural justice
literature provides suggestive evidence. An important experimental conclusion of the procedural
justice literature is that litigants will rate relatively favorably systems in which they are given a
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But see infra Part II.C (noting barriers to claim sales that may prevent markets in claims from emerging).
It might be possible to imagine an experiment assessing such a market. One problem, however, is that laboratory subjects’
assessments of whether the procedure is fair may reflect what the subjects believe they should say, rather than how fairly they
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fair amount of voice and control, 113 even independent of the effect of this control on the trial
outcome. A litigant who is given a chance to tell her story will feel better about the process than
one who is not given such a chance, even if the court treats the litigant’s story as irrelevant to its
eventual disposition. Alienation of a claim will deprive a litigant of the chance to tell the story to
one type of decisionmaker, a judge. But alienation provides a new class of neutral
decisionmakers, potential purchasers of legal claims. A litigant will be able to tell her story to
these decisionmakers, and these decisionmakers will have an incentive, different from the
judge’s but no less significant, to listen to that story. In addition, the litigant may have some
control over the process by which a decision is made. For example, a litigant can choose which
potential purchasers she will consider. In addition, a litigant may be able to choose the form in
which the litigant presents information to the court. From the perspective of process control,
alienation appears superior to procedural justice.
This analysis, however, may seem to miss the point. Perhaps what is important is not
voice and control per se, but voice and control in a certain kind of forum. Certainly, a litigant
who is interrupted and told that she may make her statements in the hallway during a court recess
will not feel as justly treated as one who is allowed to present a story before a judge. Perhaps the
formalism and dignity of a trial are what make litigants feel that their statements are being taken
into account. Indeed, there is evidence that litigants assign higher procedural justice ratings to
trial and arbitration than to bilateral settlement negotiations. 114 Even though the litigant has
ultimate control over settlement negotiations, and even though either the litigants or their lawyers
presumably tell the litigant’s side of the story in such settlement negotiations, even litigants who
agree to settlements do not emerge feeling favorable to the process. 115 Just as these results
113

See, e.g., Robert J. Bies & Debra I. Shapiro, Voice and Justification: Their Influence on Procedural Fairness Judgments, 31
ACAD. M GMT. J. 676 (1988); Robert Folger, Distributive and Procedural Justice: Combined Impact of "Voice" and Improvement
on Experienced Inequity, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 108 (1977); Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Disputant Concerns
in Mediation, 3 NEGOTIATION J. 367 (1987). Procedural justice theorists distinguish “process control,” which entails the ability to
voice one’s story and opinion, from “decision control,” which entails some control over the result, and some argue that fairness
judgments depend as much on process control as on decision control. See, e.g., LIND & T YLER, supra note 109, at 94-106, 186,
206-17.
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See E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants’ Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice
System, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 953, 965-66 (1990); see also Howard S. Erlanger et al., Participation and Flexibility in Informal
Processes: Cautions from the Divorce Context, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 585 (1987) (identifying dissatisfaction with settlement in
divorce cases). These findings were responsive to assertions by other commentators that parties would generally feel better about
settlement than about adjudicatory processes. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of
the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. RE V. 485 (1985).
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Lind et al. conclude:
Apparently, what has been overlooked in previous analyses of the likely reactions of litigants to traditional trial
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suggest that decisions made in the shadow of the law may not be equal to decisions made by
courts themselves, 116 so too, might one argue, that decisions made in the market may not be equa l
in quality to decisions made in the present judicial system.
The weakness of this argument is that the choice is not between resolution in the market
and resolution in a court, at least not in a traditional court proceeding. Because most cases settle,
the typical choice is between market resolution and settlement. There are good reasons to think
that litigants would react better to alienating claims to third parties than to settlements. Third
parties will have strong incentives to treat litigants with dignity and respect. If a third party
doesn’t treat litigants with respect, after all, the litigants can refuse to cooperate with that third
party; this is how consumers react to disrespect in markets for goods and services. 117 In bilateral
settlement negotiations, by contrast, the adversary has an incentive to challenge the litigant’s
account, and respectful treatment will not necessarily be rewarded. In addition, while both
market and settlement negotiations would be informal, the litigant who can listen to bids from
multiple third parties may feel more in control than a litigant who participates in an arm’s length
negotiation. Perhaps the settlement process can be cathartic, but the voice and process control
that it provides are less than what an alienability regime would offer. If the dignity of the
procedures is the considerable importance that litigants attach to being treated with respect and dignity. It has been
widely assumed in both policy-oriented and academic discussions of trial procedures that the formality and ritual of
trial disturb and confuse litigants. Given our findings, it seems likely that these very features of trial enhance, rather
than diminish, the apparent fairness of the procedure.
Lind et al., supra note 114, at 981.
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The results also may be a product of self-selection, as the population of litigants who choose to settle may be different from
the population of litigants who proceed to trial. Lind et al. consider this possibility as follows:
[A] litigant might have refused settlement and gone to arbitration, settlement conference, or trial because he or she
already regarded the third-party procedure as fairer. Similarly, a litigant might have settled prior to a third-party
procedure because he or she viewed the third-party procedure as unfair. For a number of reasons, however, we do not
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would logically lead to favorable, but equal, ratings of the third party-procedures and their respective settlement
procedures, because each procedure would be rated by litigants predisposed to favor that procedure….
Id. at 964-65. Parties that settle may be different from parties that go to trial for reasons other than the parties’ ex ante perceptions
of the fairness of the systems. Economic theory, after all, suggests that settlement is not a random occurrence. For example,
litigants may be more inclined to settle if they believe that their adversaries would litigate the case aggressively, imposing high
litigation costs on them. Such litigants may be relatively dissatisfied with the fairness of settlement, feeling that the outcome
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outcome of trials if their cases had gone to trial. Another selection story points in the opposite direction. Because cases that are
tried represent those in which there is the greatest differential in ex ante assessments by the parties, positive evaluations of trial
relative to settlement understate the procedural justice qualities of trial. These competing stories are difficult to weigh, however,
and the inferences that Lind et al. draw from their data must be even more tentative than they make them out to be.
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Such responses can be particularly effective when groups of consumers who believe that they have been disrespected combine
to boycott a product. Cf. Andre L. Smith, Comment, Consumer Boycotts Versus Civil Litigation: A Rudimentary Efficiency
Analysis, 43 HOW . L.J. 213 (2000) (arguing for the effectiveness of boycotts in changing corporate practices). The ability of
groups to respond to disrespect through a boycott might help avert the possibility that third-party alienators would discriminate
against plaintiffs on the basis of race or other irrelevant characteristics, even in the absence of any legal bar on such
discrimination.
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courtroom is generally an unachievable means of instilling confidence that the government has
heard the litigant’s claims, the litigant may find more solace in negotiation with neutral third
parties than with adversaries. Of course, adoption of an alienability regime would not prevent the
litigants from achieving a settlement before either party alienates its claim; settlement, after all,
is a form of claim alienation, with each side alienating its position to the other. But because
settlement is more common than trials, alienation would more often substitute for settlement
between the initial parties than it would substitute for trials, and the apparent superiority of
alienation to settlement is, thus, particularly relevant.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF CLAIM ALIENATION

A. The Economics of Inalienability
In modern economics scholarship, inalienability receives little attention and little
encouragement. Economic science, after all, is grounded in the belief that markets are ordinarily
efficient as a result of the “invisible hand,”118 and even where market failures occur, the typical
response recommended by economists will be the imposition of an appropriate tax. 119 Legally
minded economists have considered rules of inalienability, but even the most significant article
on the subject treats it almost as an afterthought. Guido Calabresi’s seminal article, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 120 receives considerable
attention for its distinction between property rules and liability rules, and there remains a lively
scholarly literature on the choice between these two approaches to protecting entitlements.121
Despite its presence in the title, inalienability receives relatively little attention. 122 Moreover,
while Calabresi and Melamed state that some restrictions on alienability may be justified as a
118

See ADAM SMITH , AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 456 (Roy Hutcheson Campbell et
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Taxes to counter negative externalities are often called Pigouvian taxes, after A.C. PIGOU , A STUDY IN PUBLIC FINANCE (3d ed.
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Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703 (1996); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability
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In the key section of the article discussing the various types of rules, Calabresi and Melamed note that they “discuss
inalienability separately.” Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 120, at 1106. They devote less than five pages to the topic, see id. at
1111-15, not an insignificant number, but a small number considering that Calabresi and Melamed’s analysis is probably the
seminal economic work on inalienability.
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second-best solution, their evaluation of inalienability rules seems unenthusiastic, designed more
to identify possible reasons than to justify existing rules.
The most important economic basis for inalienability that Calabresi and Melamed
identify is externalities. One might, for example, prevent a sale of land to a polluter on the
ground that the polluter’s activities would affect not only the polluter, but also the seller’s
neighbors. 123 Because “freeloader and information costs” may make it “practically impossible”
for neighbors to persuade the potential seller not to sell, 124 inalienability may be the most
efficient result. 125 This argument has an obvious flaw. If there was a concern that pollution might
create externalities, why not address the pollution, either by taxing or banning it, rather than the
sale of the land to a polluter? It seems, at the least, odd to create a rule to ban a transfer of
property as a proxy for banning the activity. 126 Presumably, it would be possible to develop a
more narrowly tailored solution to the problem. Even if there were some parties that
categorically should be barred from ownership, creating a rule barring anyone from selling or
purchasing an entire class of assets, on the basis of what buyers might do with those assets,
should require a strong reason to suspect that buyers are much more likely than the original
owners to impose negative externalities.
It may at first seem plaus ible to construct such an argument for legal claims. There may
be externalities in lawsuits, costs or benefits to those who are not parties, such as negative
externalities imposed upon third parties summoned to appear before the court or positive
externalities from improved deterrence. 127 There is, however, little reason to think that barring
sales of claims would reduce the negative externalities or increase the positive externalities from
legal claims. Of greater concern is the possibility that one party might impose a cost on the other
party. Settlement negotiations are akin to a bilateral monopoly problem, 128 or in multi- party cases
123

Calabresi and Melamed colorfully explain: “For instance, if Taney were allowed to sell his land to Chase, a polluter, he would
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For an explanation of the bilateral monopoly problem, see Richard D. Friedman, Antitrust Analysis and Bilateral Monopoly,
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an empty core bargaining game. 129 A party may try to obtain leverage in such negotiations by
making unreasonable discovery demands on other parties. 130 Or, a party may litigate a case to the
hilt, expending more money on the prosecution of the case than the amount of money at stake
ordinarily would demand, in order to force the other party to do similarly. Doing so might allow
a party to establish a reputation for aggressive litigation that will help it obtain settlements in
other cases. 131 Parties purchasing claims might be more likely to act in this way, the argument
goes, because their reputational capital will be more at stake.
This story, however, has significant flaws. First, although it is plausible that parties
purchasing claims will be more frequent litigants than original claimants, lawyers will be repeat
players regardless of whether parties are repeat players, and parties may tie lawyers’ hands by
selecting lawyers with reputations for aggressiveness. 132 Second, more frequent players are not
necessarily unusually obstreperous. The theoretical intuition is that a frequent litigant cannot
achieve a reputation for toughness by spend ing heavily in just one case, but must maintain the
strategy across a number of cases. Though a frequent aggressive litigant will be able to threaten
credibly, the same litigant will not be able to bluff, which is a cheaper approach and one that may
be as effective, especially with risk-averse opponents. 133 The empirical observation is that

1986 WIS. L. REV. 873, 878-83.
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A bargaining game has an empty core if for any resolution of the game, there always exists some hypothetical agreement that
a majority of those bargaining could enter into that would make them better off. For example, if a fixed sum of money is to be
split among three people by majority vote, then no outcome is stable. For example, if A and B each agree to take half and cut out
C, then C can offer A or B a higher percentage to cut out the other. Similarly, an agreement that all would share equally is not
stable, because any two participants could then decide to cut out the third. In practice, of course, parties are often able to reach
agreements in empty core bargaining games, often through equal apportionment, but the instability of all possible agreements can
lead to negotiation failure. For an elegant introduction to empty core bargaining games, see M AXWELL L. STEARNS,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS 54-58 (2000).
130
A request for discovery imposes costs on an opponent that makes settlement more attractive relative to trial, and thus
increases the bargaining power of the requestor. See generally Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Unintended
Consequences of Mandatory Disclosure, 73 T EX. L. REV. 753, 768-71 (1995) (describing how asymmetric costs in the discovery
process may affect settlement).
131
See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in
Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. RE V. 509, 525-27 (1994) (noting that law firms may cultivate and acquire reputations for being either
aggressive or conciliatory).
132
An argument that hand-tying would be ineffective is that lawyers have ethical duties to clients, including the duty to present
settlement offers to the clients. See M ODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. (2000). It is an empirical question how much
such ethical rules restrain attorneys from acting aggressively, but my suspicion is that the effect is modest, at least where a client
has chosen an attorney specifically for aggressiveness. The lawyer’s duties are difficult to police, in part because clients will rely
heavily on advice of counsel in determining whether to settle a case.
133
One way that a litigant might bluff is by hiring an aggressive attorney, only to change attorneys should the litigation proceed.
Gilson and Mnookin assume that it is cheap to change lawyers after the complaint is filed but before litigation begins. See Gilson
& Mnookin, supra note 131, at 523-24. If this was so, then it would be difficult for a party to bind itself by choosing a lawyer,
because the opponent would recognize that the initial lawyer choice is meaningless. I am skeptical, given the considerable
amount of research that filing a complaint in practice requires, that changing is cheap at this stage.
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insurance companies, the paradigmatic example of frequent litigants, often settle claims, rather
than seek a reputation for aggressiveness by fighting all claims to the end. 134 Third, litigation
may be less personal when it involves third parties, and parties concerned solely with money will
be less likely to inflict gratuitous injury on an opposing party. In sum, while we cannot a priori
eliminate the possibility that purchasers of legal claims would be less desirable than the original
claimants, there seems little reason that this should be the case.
Even if it were true that purchasers of legal claims impose more negative externalities, or
produce more expensive litigation than other parties, a total prohibition on claim sales is not a
narrowly tailored response. A more appropriate response would be to estimate the amount of the
externality, perhaps as a function of legal expenditures, and charge those who purchase claims
that amount, just as other externalities are addressed through taxes. This may seem like a silly
proposal, for if it is desirable to crack down on certain abusive practices in litigation, charging
only people who sell their legal claims is a woefully underinclusive and overinclusive response;
many litigants who do not sell their claims are aggressive, and presumably some purchasers of
claims would be eager to minimize litigation costs and work cooperatively. 135 At the least, it
would make more sense to allow claim sales and impose a tax on frequent litigants, because it is
repeat player purchasers that prompt the possibility of greater aggressiveness. The silliness, of
course, is precisely my point, for if this tax proposal is superior to a total prohibition on claims,
but there are superior alternatives to the tax proposal, those alternatives are by transitivity
superior to a total prohibition. There are a myriad of proposals to reduce litigation abuse, 136 and
while these approaches may have problems, a prohibition on claim sales is such a blunt option
that it is hard to believe that it is the best alternative. 137
134

One possible reason for this, however, is that state law sometimes provides for the possibility of sanctions against insurance
companies that fail to settle coverage disputes. See Thomas P. Billings, The Massachusetts Law of Unfair Insurance Claim
Settlement Practices, 76 M ASS. L. REV. 55, 66 (1991) (discussing such a statute).
135
See infra text accompanying note 238.
136
One significant debate examines and compares the American and British rules for allocating legal costs. See generally James
W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder, Litigation and Settlement Under the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38
J.L. & E CON. 225 (1995) (analyzing the impact of a loser pays rule on the merit of filed claims and the level of litigation).
137
An advocate of inalienability might contend that even if it was possible to enact an inalienability rule, it might not be possible
to enact a complementary provision reducing the cost of litigation. Strong organized interests, such as trial lawyers, presumably
would oppose efforts to rein in spending on cases across the board. Cf. Albert R. Hunt, The Bogus Tort-Reform Case, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 6, 2003, at A13 (conceding that trial lawyers have influenced the political debate on tort reform, though attacking reform
proposals on the merits). The existing legal system should thus be compared with one in which claim sales are permitted, not one
in which claim sales are permitted and the entire legal system is reformed. On this view, a prohibition on claim sales is a secondbest solution to the dangers that claim sales pose, considering the opposition to various forms of tort reform. It would, however,
presumably, be possible to enact a law permitting claim sales and imposing some legal restraint on just those claims, assuming
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Though the possibility that an inalienability rule might be responsive to a potential
externality is probably the most significant economic argument with respect to legal claims,
Calabresi and Melamed consider several other arguments for inalienability generally. A related
argument is that the sale itself might produce a negative externality, because third parties’ utility
might be impaired by observation of the sale or its result. “If Taney is allowed to sell himself
into slavery, or to take undue risks of becoming penniless, or to sell a kidney, Marshall may be
harmed,” they argue, “simply because Marshall is a sensitive man who is made unhappy by
seeing slaves, paupers, or persons who die because they have sold a kidney.”138 Calabresi and
Melamed label this category of cases as involving “moralisms,”139 and this word helps explain
why the argument is unlikely to be applicable to the sale of legal claims. Any mo ral argument
about alienation of legal claims is de minimis, 140 and concern that people might be bothered by
any perceived immorality in such sales seems like an even smaller concern. Sale of legal claims
might well make some people uncomfortable, at least when they think about the issue, but this
discomfort seems like a small public policy consideration, even within the realm of concerns
about the legal system. 141
Other arguments offered by Calabresi and Melamed for inalienability are less applicable
to legal claims. They note, for example, that paternalism may justify inalienability, if individuals
who would sell an entitlement would not be acting in their own self- interest. 142 Yet there is little
that it was possible to enact a law permitting claim sales in the first place. Thus, the prohibition on claim sales is, at best, a thirdbest solution.
138
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 120, at 1111-12. They elaborate: “Again Marshall could pay Taney not to sell his freedom
to Chase the slaveowner; but again, because Marshall is not one but many individuals, freeloader and information costs make
such transactions practically impossible.” Id. at 1112. Liability rules will not work because of the difficulty of objectively
measuring the cost to Marshall. Id.
139
Id. at 1112.
140
See supra Parts I.A-I.B.
141
More broadly, it seems hard to imagine any context in which discomfort itself could justify an inalienability rule. Any
“discomfort” about kidney sales seems by itself a relatively trivial concern when compared to the arguments for and against
kidney sales. There may be an argument that the commodification of kidney sales may be problematic for society, but that
concern is not simply that people are unhappy as a result of the public policy choice. Discomfort with public policy itself seems a
circular and ultimately unimportant basis for making public policy. Of course, discomfort is difficult to measure, so arguments
about it cannot be refuted with logic alone.
142
This type of argument is what Calabresi and Melamed call “true paternalism,” describing a situation in which “a person may
be better off if he is prohibited from bargaining.” Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 120, at 1114. This is distinguished from “self
paternalism,” in which a person is precluded from selling an asset as a way of vindicating the person’s earlier desire to tie his
hands and prevent a later sale. Conceivably, someone might want to tie his hands to prevent a later sale of a legal claim if
purchasers of legal claims prosecuted claims less aggressively than the claimant himself could be expected to. By tying his hands,
the potential plaintiff would reduce the chance that the potential defendant would engage in an act, such as committing a tort,
leading to the plaintiff’s having a legal claim. Though conceivable under certain sets of circumstances, the hypothetical at most
suggests that people should be able to opt out irrevocably from a regime allowing sale of legal claims.
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reason to think that individuals would make decisions not in their own self- interest. It is
conceivable that purchasers might try to induce plaintiffs to sell claims for lower than the market
rate, or to induce defendants to pay the purchasers more than they would need to pay someone
else to take on the claim, but the argument that litigants need protecting could be made in any
market setting. It is particularly inappropriate in this setting, because the relatively high value of
legal claims would give litigants strong incentives to find a good deal. Calabresi and Melamed
also note that an inalienability rule might be defended on distributional grounds; for example, a
rule barring sale of babies might be made because it “makes poorer those who can cheaply
produce babies and richer those who through some nonmarket device get free an ‘unwanted’
baby.”143 Yet this argument does not seem to apply to legal claims, since the end result of a legal
claim sale, like the end result of a trial where money damages are at stake, is the potential
transfer of money.
Calabresi and Melamed, of course, are not the last word on the economics of
inalienability, and Susan Rose-Ackerman has offered a rich and detailed account of
inalienability, 144 while Richard Epstein has offered some theories of his own in commenting on
Rose-Ackerman’s work. 145 Rose-Ackerman describes a taxonomy of entitlements which will
permit us to understand better the nature of rules prohibiting alienability of legal claims. First is
“the question of who may hold the entitlement,” namely “(a) anyone, (b) only some specified
groups, (c) everyone simultaneously, or (d) no one.”146 Second, the law may impose restrictions
on the use of property, by permitting, requiring, or forbidding some activity. 147 The third issue is
whether transfer through sale and gift are permitted. 148 In the case of a legal claim, the current
rule in most jurisdictions with respect to a personal tort claim is that only someone who has a
143

Id. at 1114. Calabresi and Melamed argue that the possibility “suggests that direct distributional motives may lie behind
asserted nondistributional grounds for inalienability.” Id. at 1114. The distributional case in the baby-selling context seems weak;
even if the benefited group is wealthier, it is not concentrated and therefore unlikely to be able to control legislative outputs
effectively. The weakness of the arguments they provide for inalienability may reveal that Calabresi and Melamed are generally
skeptical of inalienability.
144
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. RE V. 931 (1985).
145
Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. RE V. 970 (1985).
146
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 144, at 933.
147
Id. at 934. Rose-Ackerman breaks this category down further by recognizing that more than one activity might be relevant for
a particular entitlement. For example, she discusses “a zoning law in a community that also regulates historic buildings,” thus
preventing certain kinds of changes to the building while also affirmatively requiring historic preservation. Id.
148
With this category, there are four possibilities, since whether sales are permitted or forbidden may be independent of whether
gifts are permitted or forbidden. For example, Rose-Ackerman labels cases in which sales are forbidden but gifts are permitted
(such as the donation of a kidney) as “modified inalienability.” Id. at 935.
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cause of action can possess the claim, that some activities (like prosecuting the claim) may be
required, 149 and most relevantly, that the claim cannot be bought or sold. 150
Given this taxonomy, the most relevant of Rose-Ackerman’s explanations of
inalienability can be applied. Rose-Ackerman notes that a defense of the “modified
inalienability” rule for blood may be a function of imperfect information. “If it is difficult for
hospitals to judge whether blood contains the damaging hepatitis virus,” Rose-Ackerman writes,
then ideally one would design a collection system that gives contributors an incentive to reveal
any past cases of hepatitis.”151 A similar informational problem might be present in the case of
lawsuits. If someone can sell a lawsuit, then the profit motive may lead even individuals with
poor claims to bring suits. An answer to this objection depends in part on whether the market for
sale of claims will be worse than the legal system itself at identifying bad claims. 152 The analogy
implies, however, that if we wanted only plaintiffs with good claims to bring lawsuits, we should
allow transfer of claims through gift. Indeed, since profit is a motive in litigation even without
the sale of claims, we should perhaps consider allowing lawsuits only where a plaintiff has given
the lawsuit away without consideration. It is possible to imagine such a scheme, 153 and it might
succeed at weeding out frivolous claims, but the distance between such a scheme and our
existing legal practice suggests that inalienability rules cannot be explained as intended to limit
the courts to altruistic lawsuits.
Another analogy is to the Homesteading Acts, 154 which allowed settlers to acquire land
for a small fee if the y worked the land for five years. These acts prohibited sales or gifts of the
land within the five-year period. 155 Rose-Ackerman’s explanation for this approach, as opposed
149

See, e.g., Goodman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 606 F.2d 800 (1979) (discussing the equitable doctrine of laches).
See supra note 8.
151
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 144, at 945-46. In supporting this argument, she cites RICHARD T ITMUSS, T HE GIFT
RELATIONSHIP : FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY (1971).
152
See infra Part II.C.1.
153
For example, plaintiffs might be required to donate lawsuits to a government corporation that would then auction the lawsuits
off to the highest bidder. A plaintiff, even if reimbursed for the costs of donating the claim (such as appearing in court),
presumably would donate such claim only to advance the cause of justice, not for personal gain. That is, a plaintiff donating a
claim presumably would be doing so because the plaintiff derives some utility from helping the public or at least from hurting the
wrongdoer. Cf. Ward Farnsworth, The Economics of Enmity, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 211 (2002) (considering how the law should
respond to the existence of enmity between litigants). Of course, a plaintiff might use the possibility of such a donation to extract
a settlement, but such threats ordinarily would have little credibility, because the donation of the claim would extinguish the
plaintiff’s interest.
154
Homestead Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 161-302 (2002); The Enlarged Homestead Acts of 1909 and 1913, 43 U.S.C. §§ 164, 169 &
218 (2002).
155
Id.
150
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to a straight auction, 156 is a network externality story. 157 Each person inhabiting the land produced
benefits for other inhabitants, 158 just as each owner of a videocassette recorder produces benefits
for other owners by encouraging the development of video stores. 159 Litigation may ha ve
network externality properties, because, for example, the development of precedent in one case
may allow for easier resolution of a dispute in another. 160 Although I will consider later whether
allowing alienability of claims is likely to have an adverse effect on precedent, 161 once again
completion of the analogy reveals its flaws. 162 Our legal system does not penalize litigants for
settling before trial or give bonuses to litigants who take their claims to trial. While it is
conceivable that such policies might be appropriate, the prevailing belief seems to be that our
legal system would benefit from fewer rather than more cases actually tried, 163 and this belief
seems consistent with the operation of the legal system.
156

For an alternative explanation of why auctions and other sales gave way to homesteading, see Dean Lueck, The Rule of First
Possession and the Design of the Law, 38 J.L. & E CON. 393, 414-15 (1995).
157
Rose-Ackerman does not characterize it as such, because the literature on network externalities arose after her article, but her
argument is prescient. See generally Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86
CAL . L. REV. 479 (1998) (discussing the implications of network externalities for antitrust and other areas of law); S.J. Liebowitz
& Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J. ECON. PERSP . 133 (1994) (evaluating the definition of
network externalities). Rose-Ackerman characterizes the story as representing a prisoner’s dilemma. “Everyone is better off if all
settle than if no one settles, but if others settle, then it is best for each person to wait until others have overcome the initial
hardships.” Rose-Ackerman, supra note 144, at 958.
158
“It is difficult to be a pioneer in an empty land,” Rose-Ackerman writes. “Life is easier with neighbors who can help in
emergencies, share farm equipment, and assist in capital projects such as construction.” Rose-Ackerman, supra note 144, at 957.
Rose-Ackerman also suggests that homesteaders may have provided benefits to individuals not in their immediate community:
“The people attracted to the territory by this program both made future economic development easier and aided the political
ambitions of the original residents who sought to move their territories toward statehood.” Id. at 958. Similarly, one might argue,
the homesteaders facilitated development of lands further west or in less desirable adjacent locations.
159
See, e.g., Lemley & McGowan, supra note 157, at 592 (discussing network effects in the videocassette recorder market).
160
Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner have emphasized network externalities in the choice of corporate form and contract
terms, as a decision by one firm to make a particular choice confers a network benefit on other firms making the same choice. See
Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of
Boilerplate”), 83 VA . L. REV. 713 (1997); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA .
L. REV. 757 (1995). But see Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Choice of Form and Network Externalities, 43 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 79 (2001) (arguing that the popularity of the LLC form relative to the LLP form is inconsistent with the KahanKlausner hypothesis).
161
See infra Part II.C.2.b. As Rose-Ackerman recognizes, “even this limited defense of vote selling does not survive the move to
a representative system making choices by majority rule.” Rose-Ackerman, supra note 144, at 963.
162
The case may be normatively flawed as well. Epstein argues that no inalienability rule was needed to ensure efficient land
use:
To be sure, there may be some difficulty in getting isolated individuals to settle in the plains, but this hardly justifies
the set of inefficient rules that, in sharp opposition to the first possession rules at common law, required individuals to
remain on their claims indefinitely in order to perfect title. It seems likely that some less restrictive alternative could
have met the joint demands of national security and efficient land use. For example, the government could have sold
off the lands in large plots (say several square miles or more) to speculators who thereafter would have to internalize
all the costs of letting the land go into use slowly.
Epstein, supra note 145, at 989.
163
But see Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (arguing that “settlement is a capitulation to the
conditions of mass society and should be neither encouraged nor praised”); Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage
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Rose-Ackerman’s discussions of voting rules and mandatory jury service are more
relevant, because of her invocation of democratic theory. Voters cannot sell their votes, 164 even
though “in a direct democracy in which choices are made by unanimous consent, the buying of
votes does assure choices that benefit all citizens given the existing distribution of resources.”165
Similarly, one cannot hire someone else to take one’s spot on a jury. 166 The concern is that
allowing alienation of votes and jury service would affect not only the seller and purchaser, but
also society at large. 167 One might similarly argue that litigants are providing inputs into a
process, and allowing a sale of a claim might corrupt that process, resulting in worse decisions
for society as a whole. The problem with this argument is that our legal system is adversarial; it
isbased on the premise that litigants acting in their own interests will adequately represent their
own interests. The argument may explain why we do not allow private prosecution of criminal
cases; prosecutors are supposed to represent social interests rather than the interest of achieving a
maximum sentence. 168 Similarly, the argument provides an easy explanation for laws against
bribing judges. But, given a system in which litigants already have incentives to pursue their
financial interests, it is difficult to understand on economic grounds why litigants should be
prevented from alienating their claims to parties whose interests would exist solely as the result
of the economic transaction.
These arguments all proceed on the basis that litigants themselves would prefer to be able
to alienate their claims. Yet, one might argue, potential adversaries might prefer in some
circumstances to agree not to allow alienation of claims, as manifested in contractual bars on
Settlement, and Why Permit Non-Party Involvement in Settlement?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221 (1999) (constructing a model
illustrating the cost of settlement in terms of the production of settlement).
164
For a general theory helping to explain the prohibition on selling of votes, see Saul Levmore, Voting with Intensity, 53 STAN.
L. REV. 111 (2000). See also Pamela S. Karlan, Not by Money but by Virtue Won? Vote Trafficking and the Voting Rights System,
80 VA . L. RE V. 1455 (1994).
165
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 144, at 963.
166
“First, jury duty is seen by many of a duty of citizenship that people should not be able to opt out of because of better private
opportunities elsewhere.” Id. at 965.
167
The voting paradox suggests that voters obtain no value from their votes, because of the very small probability that any
individual voter will determine the result of the election. See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES
2-3 (2000). Rose-Ackerman explains that “the value of a representative democracy depends upon citizens making responsible,
well-informed choices.” Rose-Ackerman, supra note 144, at 963. This concern may be sufficient to outweigh the competing
concern that “voting is an individual, private act that should not be examined too closely by the state.” Id. Similarly, RoseAckerman states that the legal process “itself might be undermined if juries were staffed entirely by volunteers.” Id. at 965. Those
who would agree to serve on a jury, for payment from the government or from others, might not be representative of the
community as a whole.
168
Private prosecution does occur in some other countries, such as England. See Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the
Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL ’Y 357, 365-66 (1986).
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claim assignment. Just as private parties are sometimes willing in contract to limit assignability,
perhaps the ban in the tort context reflects a hypothetical contract that potential tortfeasors and
victims would have agreed to if given the chance. 169 Epstein, for example, observes that in a
contractual context, “[t]he promisee is a known quantity chosen and selected by the promisor,”
and “[e]ven if the legal system gives the promisor the same rights against the promisee’s
assignee, the value of those rights still may be reduced by the assignment,” because the promisor
loses “informal leverage” against the assignee. 170 In game theoretic terms, parties in an iterated
relationship may be able to resolve disputes relatively cheaply because of their mutual interest in
cooperating beyond the context of any particular dispute. 171 Such reasoning may, in turn, justify
default rules, such as the general rule that easements in gross are inalienable. 172 This reasoning,
however, does not appear to justify inalienability of tort claims involving parties that have not
had a chance to contract with each other. It is precisely in such cases that parties will be least
likely to have dealings with each other unrelated to the lawsuit, and so establishment of a default
rule preventing alienation cannot be presumed to be what the parties would have desired had
they had an opportunity to contract on the issue.
B. The Affirmative Economic Case for Alienability
The simplest argument for allowing plaintiffs to sell claims for money damages is that a
plaintiff will be able to receive recovery more quickly. 173 Instead of waiting for the litigation
process to conclude, a plaintiff can receive cash as soon as the plaintiff can find someone to buy
the claim, and the plaintiff may use such cash either to pay for the costs being sued for or for
other purposes. It might seem that plaintiffs should be indifferent to receiving an immediate

169

The construct of the hypothetical contract is often used in tort theory for contexts in which ex ante contracting would be
impractical. Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 357-60 (1988)
(engaging hypothetical contracts analysis for tort liability).
170
Epstein, supra note 144, at 982.
171
Cf. David M. Kreps et al., Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, 27 J. ECON. T HEORY 245, 24547 (1982) (suggesting that cooperation may be possible even in a game with a finite number of periods). A problem with this
theory as applied to assignability is that if such parties should be able to resolve disputes effectively because of the danger of
impairing relations, then they should be able to do so before a party assigns a claim. If contracting parties would temper their
aggressiveness in resolving a particular dispute because of a desire to ensure friendly relations on other issues, then surely such a
party would not make an irrevocable assignment of a claim, which presumably would damage relations if the assignee were an
aggressive litigator.
172
Epstein, supra note 145, at 984. Epstein acknowledges, however, that “there is some question whether the prohibition is
necessary to protect the interest of the landowner.” Id.
173
See, e.g., Choharis, supra note 1, at 444.
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payment and to receiving a later payment, as long as the court provides for prejudgment and
postjudgment interest. 174 Even jurisdictions that provide for such interest, however, do not tailor
the amount of interest awarded to a particular plaintiff’s discount rate. 175 Some tort plaintiffs will
face liquidity problems, particularly if they face unexpected bills attributable to the tort, such as
medical expenses, 176 and their discount rate may be higher than the prejudgment interest rate. As
long as the purchaser of the claim has a lower discount rate, a sale moves the claim to a highervaluing owner.
Equally significantly, a plaintiff’s decision to sell a claim eliminates the risk to the
plaintiff, at least if the claim is sold in its entirety. Claims may be uncertain because the law is
unclear, because facts are unknown, or because it is unclear how a judge or jury would apply the
law to the facts. 177 Sale of a claim, of course, does not eliminate any of these uncertainties, but
merely transfers them to another party. A tort claim, however, will often in effect be a significant
asset in a plaintiff’s portfolio, while a purchaser of tort claims may be able to diversify, for
example, by purchasing a variety of different tort claims, some of which will be more successful
than others. Plaintiffs will surely pay a premium, in the form of a reduction in the amount
received, for moving the risk onto the purchasers of the claims. But in a competitive market, the
premium should be equal to the burden of the risk on the purchaser, rather than on that of the
seller. Even if there was a monopoly purchaser of legal claims, the risk premium would
ordinarily be between the burden of the risk on the plaintiff and the burden of the risk on the
purchaser, given that the plaintiff and purchaser would have to negotiate a fee.
The plaintiffs’ reduction in risk may represent an increase in the accuracy of the legal
system in providing compensation to tort claimants. One advocate of allowing sale of tort claims
has noted that the resolution of a claim at trial “may be very idiosyncratic, with jury awards
varying considerably for similar injuries.”178 By chance, some juries may be more sympathetic to
174

See generally Michaell S. Knoll, A Primer on Prejudgment Interest, 75 T EX. L. REV. 293, 359 (1996) (describing the
operation of prejudgment and postjudgment interest).
175
See, e.g., T EX. FIN. CODE ANN . § 304.003 (Vernon 2003) (explaining the calculation of postjudgment interest).
176
See Thomas A. Smith, A Capital Markets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 104 YALE L.J. 367, 381 (1994) (“A tort
typically depletes partially or completely the victim’s liquid assets, as she must pay for medical expenses, substitute for lost
wages, and otherwise compensate for the loss.”).
177
The inconsistency of both punitive damage assessments and compensatory damage assessments, especially for nonpecuniary
harms, has produced proposals for systematizing damages decisions. See, e.g., David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight
of Jury Damages Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms
and Punitive Damages, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1109 (1995).
178
Choharis, supra note 1, at 468.
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a plaintiff than others, both in determining whether or not the plaintiff has a valid claim and in
determining the size of an award. Similarly, different judges (or even the same judge on different
days) might resolve the same legal issue differently, and different judges may make different
decisions on how the parties are allowed to present evidence. Even a claim that is settled may
reflect the identity of the judge who has been assigned to hear the case. The price at which a
claim is sold, assuming it is sold before a judge is selected, will reflect an expected value of the
judgment, and it will thus be an average of what different decisionmakers would decide. If
accuracy is defined as being what the average decisionmaker would decide, 179 sales of claims
may well produce more accurate results than complete litigation of them.
The improvement in accuracy from eliminating decisionmaker bias, of course, must be
balanced with any market imperfections that may cause the price of claims to deviate from the
expected value of the claims. Perhaps buyers of a claim will fail to notice some feature of the
claim that may affect its value, even though that feature ultimately would be discovered in
litigation. Uniformity in results attributable to sale of claims may indicate that similarly treated
plaintiffs are being treated similarly, but it also could indicate that differently treated plaintiffs
are being treated similarly, with the relevant differences ignored. If, for example, buyers of
claims relied solely on police reports, without considering other evidence that might affect claim
values, they might misprice automobile accident claims. Buyers, however, would have incentives
to price claims accurately, particularly if there are many prospective buyers of a claim. Plaintiffs
would have incentives to share any information that might show that their claims are more
valuable than otherwise might be thought, and buyers have incentives to seek out claim
weaknesses. Sometimes, some information that would affect claim valuation in a trial might not
be revealed to buyers and sellers, but this is a problem of settlement as well, and at least prices
will reflect estimates of how much claims would be worth given available information.
Advocates of permitting plaintiffs to sell claims argue that “the sale of tort claims will
almost always provide tort victims with greater compensation than would be available under the
present tort system.”180 The theory is that, because purchasers of legal claims are likely to be
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See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L.
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parties that can prosecute the legal claims efficiently, the net value of the claim is higher with
those purchasers than when the tort victims prosecute the claims themselves. For example,
“where claims are too small to litigate independently, claimants will be able to sell them to
investors who can consolidate them and pursue the claims economically.”181 The assertion that
tort awards will be higher is ultimately empirical, as, even placing aside the premium that a
plaintiff will pay for risk transfer, the costs of the transfer of a claim must be balanced against
any benefits. Nonetheless, as long as the transfer of a claim is of relatively low cost, efficiencies
in prosecution are likely to produce a net gain in the size of claims recovered by plaintiffs. In any
event, there is no reason to conclude that plaintiffs would sell tort claims for a small fraction of
their value. Although sale prices would be lower than judgments, the difference presumably
would reflect the cost of prosecution, including risk.
An opponent of sale of legal claims might argue that plaintiffs already may achieve many
of the benefits of selling claims by hiring attorneys on contingency fee. 182 Indeed, hiring of
contingency fee counsel reduces the risk to plaintiffs of bringing litigation, because at least the
plaintiffs will not need to worry about losing the lawsuit and being out attorneys’ fees.
Contingency fees, however, do not eliminate the risk of litigation altogether, or even very much.
In addition, contingency fees can create tensions between optimal strategies for a lawyer and a
client. 183 A lawyer may have a greater incentive to settle a case if the lawyer will bear the cost of
preparing the case, 184 or a lesser incentive if the lawyer is less risk-averse than the client, 185 and
the incentives will cancel out only by happenstance. 186 Professional responsibility rules seek to
ensure that a lawyer will act in the client’s best interest, 187 and those rules may, to some extent,
align incentives, but they are surely imperfect. If a legal claim is sold in its entirety, however, the
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owner of the claim will be acting entirely in her own interest. 188 Although she may hire a lawyer
to actually prosecute the claim, rather than pursue it pro se, she will presumably be in the
business of buying claims and thus be in a better position to monitor the lawyer and reduce the
danger of agency costs.
The legal claims market is also likely to steer claims to the lawyers who are best suited to
bring the claims. The process of seeking out a contingency fee lawyer may provide some
information to plaintiffs about whether they have viable claims, as contingency fee lawyers will
reject claims that are not worth their effort. In a market for legal claims, the prices that buyers
offer would provide plaintiffs with an assessment of the value of their claims and an indication of
which third parties are best situated to prosecute the claims. Though it will not always be the best
lawyer who offers the most for a claim—top attorneys will not waste their time on claims that
they consider trivial—the third party who purchases a claim is presumably the party that can
maximize its value, taking into account the value of the third party’s time in prosecuting the
claim. A contingency percentage offered, by contrast, is not necessarily a good indication of the
likelihood of success by a particular contingency fee lawyer, 189 for a plaintiff will have difficulty
evaluating whether to accept a lower contingency fee from a better lawyer, even if the plaintiff
knows who the better lawyer is. Though contingency fees may help assure that claims are
efficiently assigned to lawyers, a market for legal claims is likely to accomplish this task
better. 190
Sale of legal claims also may produce more efficient lawyering than contingency fee
lawyering because purchasers of large claims may be able to obtain financing more easily than
contingency fee lawyers. 191 The market for contingency fee lawyers is effectively restricted to
firms that can afford large risks, and the size of contingency fees reflects the risks that their
188
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lawyers are assuming. Although large risks are commonplace in the world of business, where
venture capitalists are willing to suffer a number of losers in exchange for one winner, lawyers in
firms may not be as well diversified as venture capitalists. Professional responsibility rules may
limit the ability of law firms to securitize claims or to obtain other forms of speculative
financing. 192 Because the purchasers of legal claims would be prosecuting those claims on their
own behalf, these restrictions presumably would not apply. A corporation easily could be
established to prosecute a single large claim, and shares of the corporation could even be
publicly traded, meaning that the ultimate owners of the corporation would be able to diversify
their risk. The corporation could then hire lawyers to accomplish the prosecution. Naturally, not
every claim purchase would accord with this approach—buyers would have to weigh the costs of
such financing as well as the agency costs of paying salary to lawyers rather than contingency
fees—but the possibility of such financing might increase the return of many plaintiffs.
Such creative financing might be particularly important in mass litigation, involving a
large number of plaintiffs suing a single or small number of defendants. One justification for the
class action device is that it serves to consolidate claims with a single law firm. A concern that
the Supreme Court has voiced about class actions is that when the same lawyer serves different
plaintiffs, the lawyer will face conflicts of interest and may treat the plaintiffs inequitably. 193
One answer to this dilemma is subclassing, 194 which allows different lawyers to represent
different groups of plaintiffs, but even this tool will be effective only when the significant
distinctions among plaintiffs are easily measured. If individual plaintiffs could sell legal claims,
purchasers would have an incentive to buy large numbers of similar claims, assuming that
prosecution of large numbers of similar claims produces economies of scale. Subclassing would
likely naturally develop as different firms specialized in different types of plaintiffs’ claims, but
even if it did not, there would not need to be a concern with conflicts of interest, as claim owners
would press only claims that they owned. Because purchasers would have to convince plaintiffs
to sell claims to them, rather than to some other purchaser or to none at all, purchasers would not
be able to treat some plaintiffs better than others. Claim sales thus may allow for efficient
192
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prosecution of claims when the class action device would not be available for conflict-of- interest
reasons.
These considerations all suggest that permitting sale of claims should be allowed because
it would benefit plaintiffs. Defendants, of course, might dislike a rule allowing plaintiffs to sell
their claims, if it makes it easier for plaintiffs to bring claims. Defendants, unless vindictive,
should not mind that sale of a legal claim allows a plaintiff to transfer risk. Nevertheless, if
transfer of a claim allows a plaintiff to obtain better representation or to bring a claim that
otherwise would not be worth bringing, defendants are made worse off. It might thus seem that
many of the benefits to plaintiffs are offset by the cost to defendants and that the reforms are
more or less a wash. This criticism shows that merely analyzing benefits to plaintiffs provides an
incomplete analysis, but it does not provide a counter to any of the arguments for allowing a sale
of claims. The legal system, after all, is designed to make it possible for people to bring
grievances. Presumably, if it were possible to wave a magic wand and make litigation costless
without any other adverse effects, the wand would be waved, and the wand should similarly be
waved to make litigation cheaper. Though there may be an argument that the legal system works
best when the costs to the parties are roughly equal, there is no reason that costs would not be
roughly equal after the sale of a claim to a buyer who would become the new plaintiff.
Moreover, the goal of the legal system is not to benefit plaintiffs and defendants equally,
but to provide compensation for plaintiffs and deterrence for potential tortfeasors who later
become defendants. Allowing sale of claims may increase deterrence, if some plaintiffs who
would not wish to bring legal actions themselves are willing to sell their claims. This might be
the case if some potential plaintiffs are averse to the risks inherent in the legal process or simply
cannot find a suitable attorney to bring a claim. When victims fail to bring claims against those
who have violated the standard of care and caused injury, the injurers will not internalize the
costs, so an innovation that facilitates the filing of legitimate claims may produce social benefits.
Although punitive damages in theory might be able to ensure perfect deterrence even if only
some claims are brought, 195 punitive damages generally do not depend on the probability of
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detection and prosecution, 196 and so encouraging the filing of all claims may be the only way to
move the legal system closer to perfect deterrence. The legal system should be concerned about
frivolous claims and about the danger that innocent defendants may be forced to spend money in
defense, but prohibiting sale of claims is as likely to discourage meritorious as nonmeritorious
claims for a given amount.
All of the arguments for allowing plaintiffs to sell their claims, in any event, militate
equally toward permitting defendants to pay a third party to assume the burden of a claim for
money damages. Defendants also would benefit from resolving litigation more quickly and from
transferring the risk of litigation to third parties. If the sale of claims produces more accurate
resolution of claims for plaintiffs, then so too, for plaintiffs, might the price that a defendant pays
to rid itself of a claim be closer to what an average judge or jury would decree than would a
decision by an actual judge or jury. If the parties being paid to take on the burden of defending a
claim are more efficient defenders than defendants, then defendants might end up paying less in
total than otherwise would be required. Some of these benefits, of course, might be smaller if
defendants, in general, are larger than plaintiffs. Large corporations, after all, are relatively riskaverse and well situated to defend themselves efficiently. This may explain why the literature has
focused on sale of claims by plaintiffs rather than on alienation of claims by defendants.
Plaintiffs and defendants, however, come in all sizes, and the theoretical arguments in favor of
permitting alienation apply equally well to both.
C. The Economic Counterargument
This section builds a set of economic arguments suggesting drawbacks of an alienability
regime that may offset the advantages discussed above. The first problem, documented in Part
II.C.1, is that asymmetric information about the quality of legal claims may make sales of claims
rare. This argument might appear merely to indicate that the benefits of claim alienation are
smaller than one otherwise might think, but the argument also is important because it is likely to
make other economic problems with alienability more severe. 197 In particular, the dangers that
alienation of claims might interfere with legal process or discourage settlement, as explained in
196
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Parts II.C.1-2, are likely to be more serious when only a relatively small number of claims are
alienated. The ultimate economic balance is thus uncertain. While robust legal claims markets
might well produce considerable benefits, costs might well exceed benefits in the thin trading
markets that adverse selection problems are likely to produce.
1. The Lemons Problem
A market for claims is likely to be beset by an adverse selection or “lemons” problem. 198
Just as potential sellers of used cars have better information about the quality of their vehicles
than can be assessed easily by third parties, 199 so too do the original parties to a dispute have
unique access to information about their claims. Thus, if alienation is allowed, parties that
choose to alienate their claims would not be a random sample of all parties, but those that
anticipate that buyers will most overvalue their claims relative to other claims. Although unable
to value individual claims accurately, buyers will recognize that the claims that are being
alienated are generally of lower quality than other claims, just as used car buyers recognize that
used cars being sold are generally worse than used cars not being sold. Buyers will discount their
offers correspondingly. This discounting will mean that some claim owners who believed,
because of asymmetric information, that their claims would be valued highly relative to the
universe of all claims, will decide not to alienate their claims after all. This phenomenon will
tend to make the pool of claims being alienated even worse, leading to a bigger price discounting
by buyers, more owners deciding not to alienate their claims, and so on.
Adverse selection could cause the market to unravel completely, 200 or the effect could be
more modest, with an equilibrium in which some cases are alienated and some cases are not.201
There is a used car market, after all, but presumably not as robust a market as there would be if
used cars could be objectively, accurately, and costlessly valued. Presumably, if alienation of
legal claims were allowed, some legal claims would be alienated. There are reasons, however, to
198
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think that the market in legal claims would be thin. Even more than with used cars, a legal claim
is a form of property in which asymmetric information will be commonplace. 202 A party might,
for example, suspect that a particular witness will give damaging testimony, or it might simply
know a number of tangential details about a transaction that cumulatively would justify a belief
that a court would not be favorable. Even if this is true in only a relatively small percentage of
cases, the effect might be enough to limit alienation of claims significantly.
Aggravating the adverse selection problem in the legal context is that one form of
alienation is permitted—settlement. A third party that purchases a plaintiff’s claim must not only
worry that the plaintiff might withhold information, but also must wonder why the defendant did
not offer a better deal than the third party. The defendant, after all, also is likely to have an
informational advantage over the third party. Third parties are likely to purchase claims only
when they expect to be able to make a profit from doing so, even taking into account the costs of
researching and developing the claim. In such situations, however, a defendant would ordinarily
have an incentive to offer a more attractive deal than the third party if the third party was not
overpaying. The third party would recognize that if the plaintiff accepts the third party’s offer to
purchase the claim, the plaintiff was unable to get a better deal from the defendant, indicating
that in any consummated transaction, the defendant, who has better information than the third
party, will believe that the third party overpaid. It gets even worse. Even if the third party
strongly believed that the defendant was wrong, the fact of the defendant’s confidence means
that settlement is less likely than it usually is, and the greater-than- normal expected cost of
litigation makes the claim even less valuable.
Third parties, of course, could spend money to verify legal claims, for example by
investigating background facts and by soliciting affidavits, before agreeing to alienation. Such
verification, however, is likely to be expensive, and the cost may be particularly prohibitive if the
original party retains the right not to alienate the claim at all. 203 Spending money to investigate a
claim is harder to justify, the lower the probability that the third party will be able to enter into a
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contract to alienate the claim. Investigation, moreover, may be more difficult to achieve when
information is not within the plaintiff’s possession. For example, if the defendant needs to be
deposed, then the plaintiff would need to conduct such discovery. (It is possible to imagine a rule
that allows third parties to conduct independent discovery, but this could be duplicative and
burdensome.) Once the plaintiff conducts discovery to provide information to third parties,
however, there is less benefit from sale of the plaintiff’s claims. A claim sale is far less likely to
effect a transfer to the party able to prosecute the litigation most cost effectively when the claim
sale occurs immediately before trial. At that point, most claims have settled anyway, many of the
costs of litigation have already been incurred, and the effort required by the purchaser’s lawyers
to learn the facts of the case will be particularly costly.
How robust a market would be given the abolition of restrictions on alienation is an
empirical question, and a currently unanswerable one. The relative rareness of alienation of tort
claims in states that appear to have only minimal legal barriers to such alienation, such as Texas,
might be a function of natural market pressures or of whatever restrictions on claim alienation
exist. There is, however, one critical datum suggesting that impediments to a robust market in
legal claims might be severe: the absence of alienation of claims by defendants. Existing rules on
sales of claims do not prevent defendants from purchasing insurance, with the price of policies
dependent on the facts of individual cases, 204 and with the agreement providing that the insurance
company would defend the claim. 205 Yet the only liability insurance widely available excludes
causes of action that arose before the insurance was purchased. 206 In principle, a company could
204
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sell insurance on a particular claim, thus allowing defendants to reduce the risk of litigation by
transferring it onto a relatively risk-neutral party, but such transactions seem to occur rarely.
The absence of insurance for defendants does not necessarily mean that there would be
few purchases of plaintiffs’ claims because the pool of plaintiffs and the pool of defendants may
be different. Perhaps there is simply no demand for insurance for defendants. 207 Large
corporations, for example, may be relatively risk- neutral, especially because they are generally
held by shareholders in diverse portfolios, 208 and such corporations may be defendants more
often than plaintiffs, especially in tort suits. 209 Nonetheless, even if a relatively high proportion of
defendants would not benefit from alienating claims, the total number of defendants is so large
that there must be a large absolute number of defe ndants who are sufficiently risk-averse that
they would pay some fee to liquidate their uncertain liabilities. Of course, defendants can
liquidate their uncertain liabilities, regardless of the alienation regime, by settling with plaintiffs,
but there will be some cases that do not settle, for example because one party has an unrealistic
expectation of the likely judgment. 210 If there was a competitive insurance market, defendants
would purchase insurance whenever insurance companies offered a better deal tha n plaintiffs.
The absence of such a market indicates that insurance companies and other third parties believe
that they cannot make better offers than plaintiffs and still make a profit. Similarly, it is possible
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that third parties considering purchases of plaintiffs’ tort claims will not believe that they can
make better offers than defendants and still make a profit.
The failure of an insurance market to exist is surprising, placing the asymmetric
information problem aside, given the dynamics of settlement negotiations. Consider, for
example, a case in which the plaintiff and the defendant each privately estimate liability at
$1,000,000 on average and the cost of litigating the lawsuit at $100,000 each. Suppose that for
each party, this $100,000 includes $50,000 in attorney expenses and $50,000 in risk cost
attributable to the uncertainty of the litigation outcome. 211 This case is one that should settle,
given that the plaintiff will be better off settling than litigating for any settlement over $900,000,
and the defendant will be better off settling than litigating for any settlement up to $1,100,000. If
a defendant was uniquely able effectively to alienate a claim by purchasing insurance from a
relatively risk- neutral insurance company, say for simplicity a company that also would need to
pay litigation costs of $50,000 if the suit went to trial but no cost attributable to uncertainty, the
settlement range would become smaller, from $900,000 to $1,050,000. The insurance company
would be in a better bargaining position than the defendant would have been in, and the
insurance company should thus be able to capture a greater portion of the surplus from
settlement, $25,000 more if the settlement is in the middle of the range in either scenario. If the
insurance market was competitive, the defendant should in effect be able to capture this entire
surplus. The complete absence of a competitive insurance market means that the lemons problem
must dwarf this surplus, including under the “lemons” heading the cost that insurance companies
would bear to investigate legal claims before insuring defendants against them.
2. Effects on Legal Process
a. Cooperation

The simplest argument that alienability would interfere with the legal process is that once
a claim is alienated, the alienator will have little incentive to cooperate in the prosecution or
defense of the lawsuit. Prosecuting a suit, on this view, depends not solely on legal skill, but also
211
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on access to facts and evidence, which may be uniquely in the possession of the original parties
to the suit. Defenders of alienability regimes have suggested that a purchaser could combat this
problem by purchasing a right to only a portion of a claim. “A purchaser thus might purchase
only 90 percent of the claim, leaving the tort victim with 10 percent at risk as an incentive to
cooperate in pursuing the claim.”212 Similarly, a defendant might pay a third party to assume
responsibility for only 90 percent of any subsequent judgment. Presumably, if cooperation was
an issue, parties would ne gotiate to leave one party with a sufficient percentage, which might
depend on the factual circumstances, so that the original party would have incentives to stay
involved. 213 In addition, a seller and purchaser might require cooperation by contract, providing a
cause of action in the event of noncooperation. 214
Even if such arrangements could not assure full post-alienation cooperation, a lack of
cooperation need not hamper the legal system in cases affected. Indeed, there is a strong
argument that lack of cooperation might benefit the legal system, at least if cooperation is a
euphemism for perjury, or less drastically for shading facts in testimony in a direction that would
tend to benefit the litigant. A plaintiff who claims high pain-and-suffering damages ordinarily
might have an incentive to exaggerate the pain suffered when testifying, 215 but there is less
incentive to lie if the victim will no longer be affected by the court’s judgment because the
plaintiff is now a claim purchaser. Other forms of cooperation in litigation, such as information
sharing, may be important, but the legal system should be able to overcome noncooperation. The
courts, after all, routinely use subpoena powers to force unwilling individuals to provide
information of interest, 216 and violators face sanctions including contempt of court. The litigating
parties could seek information from the original parties just as they could from third parties, and
any incentives to be uncooperative with the opposing party should be no higher than before. 217
212
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Nonetheless, use of compulsion is expensive and inefficient. The possibility of
noncooperation thus worsens the adverse selection problem, especially because knowledge of
whether the original litigant will cooperate is asymmetric. Those who see alienation as an
opportunity to reduce their involvement in the litigation are most likely to alienate their claims,
and a resulting tendency will be that litigated cases are particularly likely to be lemons involving
noncooperating litigants. There is, however, a countervailing tendency that is perhaps of even
greater concern. The cases in which plaintiffs are likely to alienate their claims will tend to be
those in which the original litigant’s cooperation will be less of an issue. Because straightforward
claims are more likely to be settled than alienated, the cases in which alienation occurs are likely
to be complex. Many of these claims will demand cooperation from a different set of potential
witnesses—experts. The parties that are in the best position to buy claims will be those who have
the greatest confidence that they have cooperating experts.
Although expert witnesses serve a useful role in an adversary system, they pose dangers.
Some scholars have worried that courts are ill-equipped to resolve battles among experts, 218 and
others have cautioned that litigants may be able to find experts who can make any position seem
plausible to jurors. 219 An alienability regime increases the likelihood of a match between a
litigant’s position and an expert who will take that position, because an alienability regime
allows lawyers, who may have contacts with experts, to seek out clients, rather than the reverse.
An alienability regime’s tendency to move claims to those who can best prosecute them
ordinarily would seem like a social benefit, but the assessment is at least closer once we consider
the possibility that the parties in the best position to resuscitate weak claims may be those best
positioned to make a bad case sound good. Perhaps it is already easy for any litigant to find an
expert who will take any position, but it currently may be difficult for litigants to assess how
effective these experts will be. An alienability regime would allow someone who has gamed the
system in one case to do so in others as well. If access to experts is one of the few factors that
can overcome the adverse selection barriers to alienation, such access may be worrisome in a
significant percentage of lawsuits involving alienated claims.
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b. Precedent

A second possibility is that alienability might affect the legal system adversely by
changing the pool of cases about which appellate decisions are rendered and from which rules of
precedent are created. Even under our existing legal system, appellate cases may not be
representative of the broader universe of disputes, because cases that go to trial may be different
from cases that settle, 220 because cases that are appealed may be different from those that are not
appealed, and because judges may selectively decide which cases to craft written opinions. 221 The
selection of cases for appellate litigation is important not only because some issues may be
resolved sooner than others, but also because the law itself may be path dependent. 222 While
some degree of path dependency may be unavoidable, it may be particularly problematic if
litigants can manipulate the path of decisionmaking. 223 Concern about the possibility of such
manipulation, Maxwell Stearns has argued, helps in explaining modern standing doctrine. 224 If
interest groups can determine when lawsuits are brought, they may be able to manipulate the
path of the law, 225 and legal institutions may have evolved various means of preventing such
manipulation. Perhaps the bar on alienating legal claims is one such institution.
Allowing alienation of legal claims might permit interest groups to determine when
decisions are rendered and perhaps also to determine who will render those decisions. 226 An
interest group, for example, might purchase a claim specifically because a case presents a
particular issue, and the interest group believes that aggressive litigation of the issue in that
220
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particular court is likely to lead to creation of a favorable precedent. The interest group might
especially seek to purchase claims in which the opponents’ lawyers are unlikely to be effective.
One plausible reason for such lack of effectiveness would be that the immediate financial stakes
are small, and the resulting asymmetry in the stakes if such claims are purchased makes it more
likely that the interest group will succeed in the litigation. 227 Similarly, a litigant, whether an
interest group or not, might find a case that presents the same legal issue as the case in which it is
involved, but with better facts. The litigant might then purchase that claim and attempt to ensure
that it is resolved by the courts first. Conversely, a litigant might be concerned about a case with
worse facts and purchase that claim simply to settle it and thus avoid the possibility of an adverse
precedent. More disturbingly, a litigant might assume a position in a litigation contrary to the
litigant’s own beliefs or interests and then purposefully offer bad arguments in favor of that
position, in the hope of achieving a useful precedent in another case.
Some obstacles, however, might frustrate attempts to manipulate precedent through
claims purchases. While the strength of facts in a particular case could influence appellate
decisions on issues relevant both to those facts and to very different ones, appellate judges often
recognize that they are making decisions that will affect a variety of different factual scenarios.228
The adversary system gives the opposition incentives to identify factual situations in which a
particular resolution of a legal issue may lead to results that seem less intuitively attractive tha n
in the existing case. Moreover, it is quite a bit of trouble to purchase another suit simply out of a
desire to control which of two factual situations is presented to a court first. It is unlikely that a
litigant will be able to identify another case likely to reach the courts before its own case and
presents the same issue, but with different facts, even though the court had never addressed that
issue before. And even when a litigant does identify such a case, and is able to convince the
owner of the claim to alienate it, the litigant may be disappointed by which case is decided first.
After all, the litigant’s opponents may have precisely the opposite incentives as the litigant with
respect to the order in which the cases are presented.
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Similar possibilities for manipulation exist in our current legal system. Interest groups
can seek to find test cases that will allow for incremental development of doctrine in a way that
will favor the interest groups’ long term interests. 229 Third parties, moreover, can facilitate
settlements by giving money to a party, even in cases that have already been docketed by the
Supreme Court, in order to avoid a Supreme Court adjudication that might be unfavorable to
such third parties. 230 Presumably, the legal system might address such interference, for example,
by criminalizing such activity, by holding parties that engage in such activity in contempt of
court, or by disallowing collusive settlements. 231 That the legal system generally does not address
such interference may suggest that the consequences are small. Permitting alienation of claims,
however, would make manipulation of the path of decisions far easier than it is today. Paying off
litigants to drop cases is expensive and serves only to delay decisionmaking. Purchased cla ims
offer a more direct potential to influence the law and at lower cost because the claims themselves
are valuable assets. Scholars like Cass Sunstein have argued that courts should seek to take small
steps in decisionmaking, 232 but alienability may help interest groups force courts to make
decisions relatively early. Once again, these problems may seem de minimis if robust markets for
claims emerged. If an ability to manipulate precedent is one of the few factors sufficient to
overcome the barriers to alienation, then the costs of allowing such manipulation may be large
relative to the benefits of allowing alienation.
c. Settlement

Attempts at path manipulation could either reduce settlement, as litigants seek to place
issues before the courts, or increase settlement, as litigants seek to prevent courts from rendering
decisions. Even without deliberate path manipulation, adoption of a rule allowing the alienability
of claims could affect settlement rates. The standard economic theory of litigation indicates that
cases will settle when parties’ estimates of the probability of success and expected judgment are
229
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not too far apart. 233 Alienation of claims, however, is most likely to occur when the claim
purchaser is relatively optimistic about the claim, and in particular more optimistic than either
the initial holder of the claim or the opponent of the holder of the claim. Thus, those who
purchase claims (or accept money to take them on) are less likely to be willing to settle. The
problem may be more severe when several potential purchasers of a claim bid against one
another, as the most optimistic of the potential purchasers is likely to win the claim. This danger
reflects the “winner’s curse”234 that threatens all auctions. The application of the curse, however,
has consequences not only for the winner, but also for the legal system as a whole. The thinner
the market for claims overall, the more serious the winner’s curse problem is likely to be in
individual cases.
A standard response to winner’s curse problems is that rational bidders will take the
winner’s curse into account and, at least over time, will learn to discount their bids by the
estimated size of the curse. 235 If such a rational response occurs, those who purchase claims will
not systematically get bad deals in doing so. Settlement, however, is likely to be reduced as a
result of the winner’s curse, even with rational discounting of claim values to adjust for the
curse. The discount that an auction bidder applies to overcome the winner’s curse reflects the
amount by which overbidding is likely in general. Even if this discount is enough so that an
auction winner will not overvalue a claim, the untailored nature of rational discounting means
that an auction winner’s best estimate of the claim value will be subject to considerable
uncertainty. The auction winner may have won simply by virtue of better information about how
the courts are likely to rule, and even if the auction winner concludes that it likely did not know
about certain information, it will not know whether such information is more or less important
than in the typical case. With a high variance estimate of claim value, auction winners will likely
spend more time researching claims. Moreover, they will be more hesitant to settle, because of
the greater possibility that the adversary will take advantage of the auction winner’s
informational disadvantage.
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The possibility of reduced settlement with alienated claims is of concern not only because
of the corresponding increase in the cost of litigation, but also because cases that do not settle are
more likely to set precedents. Presumably, the number of precedents created would not change
much, if at all, assuming that precedent production depends more on supply-side than on
demand-side factors, 236 but the types of precedents produced might be different. In particular,
alienability might produce a relative increase in precedents in areas of law that are relatively
clear. These are the cases most likely to be alienated because information asymmetry is less of a
danger when the law is clear, but once alienation occurs, the analysis suggests that a smaller
percentage of these cases will settle than otherwise would without alienation. Even assuming the
number of alienated claims is small, if alienation of a claim significantly reduces the chance of
settlement, the overall effect on the pool of precedents could be large because taking litigation all
the way to trial is ordinarily so rare. 237
The magnitude of these effects is difficult to predict, and there might be countervailing
considerations. Perhaps parties in the best position to be claim purchasers will be those who are
particularly skilled at achieving settlements, 238 and this consideration might offset the reduction
in settlement traceable to information problems. The problem, however, is precisely that the
effects are so difficult to predict. My argument is not that adverse selection dooms economic
arguments in favor of permitting alienation of legal claims, but that it adds considerable
complications, and that these problems conceivably could be severe relative to the benefits that
claim alienation would provide. Such problems might not be more severe, however, and my
purpose is to suggest that any experiments with permitting alienation would need to be
monitored closely, not to suggest that society should not dare to experiment.
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III. MANDATORY ALIENATION

In law, as in boxing, the names of the parties become the name of the event. AliFrazier, 239 Marbury v. Madison. 240 Perhaps this is just convention, but it reflects that in the end, a
civil suit ends with a judgment, dictating how the defendant must act with respect to the plaintiff.
As in boxing too, the main event often seems like a sideshow, with pretrial maneuvering by
lawyers or pretrial decisionmaking by judges turning the trial into an anticlimactic fight that
rarely lives up to the hype. Any result but a definitive knockout leaves the decisionmaker open to
claims of bias or folly, and even a definitive victory may be seen as the product of seemingly
irrelevant circumstance—failure to train in the optimal location in boxing, 241 ineffective attorneys
in law. 242 The metaphor, though, cannot be stretched too far, for in boxing, eventually the
combatants are alone together in a ring, the trainers and promoters left to mere advice giving and
spectating. The same cannot be said of law, where the trial may never occur and where, even if it
does, the lawyers take center stage. And yet we persist in referring to lawsuits with the names of
the parties.
This convention lies on a sound foundation in a legal system in which claim alienation is
rare, for whatever their involvement, the parties are bound by the court’s judgment. It is possible,
though, to imagine an opposite regime, one in which the parties never have a stake once a case
reaches trial. In a mandatory alienation regime, parties would be required to alienate their legal
claims. That is, a plaintiff would be forbidden from initiating a lawsuit on her own behalf and
instead would be required to sell the legal claim to a third party. Similarly, a defendant would be
required to pay off a third party to assume the burden of any judgment. Settlement could occur in
a mandatory alienation regime both before and after alienation. So far, this Article has
239
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considered the possibility of alienation in a world of trial, but the mandatory alienation regime
allows a comparison between a world in which the final outcome of an unresolved dispute for the
litigants is trial and a world in which the final outcome is alienation.
The mandatory alienation hypothetical turns out to have some surprising benefits, but it
seems unlikely that any legislature would enact it. My purpose is solely to use this hypothetical
as a heuristic to facilitate an evaluation of how the market would perform as a legal system.
Previous scholars considering restraints on alienation have failed to consider the dynamics of a
market for tort claims, in effect taking the market prices for claims as exogenous. The
commentators have thus not considered whether a market could serve as an acceptable substitute
for judges and juries in valuing legal claims. Because the original parties to a litigation would
never be directly affected by a judicial decision in a world of mandatory alienation, the construct
forces us to consider whether claim sales can do justice as to the original parties in a litigation.
Relevant economic considerations include how accurate the market is likely to be in evaluating
claims and how costly the market process itself would be.
Mandatory alienation is a particularly useful heuristic for constructing an assessment of a
world in which alienation is pervasive but not universal. Although this Article has shown that
there are substantial nonlegal obstacles to development of robust markets for claims, it is
possible that these obstacles could be overcome in some contexts. If there is some substantial
number of claims for which the advantages of alienation outweigh the disadvantages attributable
to adverse selection, then adverse selection might be less of a proble m for other claims. Perhaps
asymmetric information is relatively unimportant for some areas of law, because the legal
outcome will depend little on eyewitness testimony or credibility determinations. The same
arguments that show how a market for claims could unravel also indicate that if some critical
number of claims were alienated, the market could ravel back up again. The mandatory
alienation hypothetical assumes away the challenges that might block formation of a robust
claim market and focuses attentio n on the market itself. The resulting question is whether the
various arguments developed in Parts I and II continue to apply if a robust market for some type
of claim were to develop.
This part of the Article argues that the arguments no longer apply. Part III.A reconsiders
the economic arguments. Not only would a mandatory alienation regime make the economic
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concerns discussed above far less significant, but it also would have other virtues. Although a
full empirical analysis is impossible without experimentation, the market likely would price
claims relatively accurately, considering at least information in the possession of the party whose
claim is alienated and perhaps other information as well. Third party purchasers would have
strong incentives to anticipate how judges or juries would evaluate claims, and the original
parties would have some incentive to share information with such third parties. Whether these
virtues are sufficient to overcome the economic vices of mandatory alienation is uncertain, but
the virtues would, for the most part, exist without the vices of a permissive alienability regime in
which alienation became pervasive. The economic analysis thus suggests that if pervasive
alienation can overcome the adverse selection problem, the market is likely to serve as a strong
substitute for a court system for those claims that are alienated.
Part III.B, however, suggests that noneconomic concerns would become might become
more serious in a mandatory alienation regime. Once claim sales are no longer voluntary,
arguments about commodification, corrective justice, legal ethics, and procedural justice, at least,
would become more powerful. A caution is that there is a meaningful moral difference between a
world in which alienation is required and one in which almost everyone voluntarily alienates
claims. A final philosophical assessment of a successful alienability regime may thus depend on
the extent to which alienation is coerced. Although a full philosophical analysis of coercion is
beyond the scope of this Article, 243 if alienation is financially attractive, there is in effect a tax on
those who choose not to alienate. If that tax was so high that no one could afford trial, it seems
fair to consider alienation coerced, but the coercion might be less with a lower effective tax and a
lower resulting alienation rate.
A. The Economics of Mandatory Alienation
The most obvious virtue of a mandatory alienation regime is that it solves the adverse
selection problem. It is a familiar point from analysis of insurance that compulsory insurance
eliminates any danger that adverse selection will cause the market to unravel. 244 Thus, mandatory
alienation may be a necessary requirement for the purported advantages of alienation, such as
243
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enabling plaintiffs to obtain judgments and defendants to liquidate liabilities more quickly, to
materialize. Mandatory alienation does not eliminate the other economic problems associated
with alienation. It is still possible, for example, that alienation would facilitate interest group
manipulation of the path of legal decisions, but it would no longer be the case that such attempts
at manipulation would exist in a relatively high percentage of cases alienated. Similarly, while
mandatory alienation would still help to match claims and experts, it would no longer be the case
that alienated cases are particularly likely to be those in which litigants ordinarily would not be
able to find persuasive experts to adopt their positions. Finally, alienated cases would no longer
be those in which the purchaser has a particularly rosy view of the case, so the danger that
alienation might frustrate settlement is reduced.
Ordinarily, eliminating an option that a person would have makes a person worse off (or
at least no better off), and it might seem that if a party would not want to alienate a legal claim,
the legal system must be making that party worse off by requiring alienation. In this context,
however, the logic need not apply, because the duty to alienate a claim furnishes a sufficient
explanation for the individual’s decision to alienate it. The decision to alienate a claim ordinarily
conveys negative information about the claim’s value, but the removal of the option means that
no negative information is conveyed. There will be no stigma in trying to alienate a claim if
everyone is required to do so, and thus a rule requiring alienation will make better off both
parties that would alienate their claims anyway and parties that would not alienate their claims
solely because of the negative information that a decision to alienate a claim would convey. The
only litigants who could be worse off are those who would choose not to alienate their claims
even in a hypothetical world in which there was no negative signal associated with the alienation
decisio n.
The enactment of a rule mandating alienation of legal claims, whether in one area of the
law or more generally, would not merely affect individual parties or cases, but rather would
change the nature of litigation more broadly. The market mandate would create third parties who
in effect would become judges of the underlying claims. The following analysis thus does not
consider whether any particular party would benefit from mandatory alienation, nor does it
attempt to sum up the winners and losers in search of a net gain or loss. Rather, it evaluates
mandatory alienation as a market process that resolves the claims of the original litigants in a
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dispute. The combination of the neutrality and the prospective interest of the third parties, as well
as the competition among them to value claims accurately, would drive this process. Properly
conceived, a rule mandating alienation of legal claims would not save disputants from litigation,
but it would transform how they experience litigation. For the initial litigants, the market would
in effect become what is now the trial. The economic viability of the rule depends both on the
nature of this shadow legal process as well as on that of the legal process that would remain.
One benefit of mandatory alienation is that it would help to neutralize any systematic bias
by decisionmakers. For example, if courts are systematically biased toward plaintiffs in
insurance claim litigation, 245 mandatory alienation would offer a solution. 246 It may be difficult
for a jury to focus on the terms of an insurance contract when a policyholder has suffered a
serious injury. Regardless of whether the jury believes that the insurance company has acted
appropriately, there is a redistributive temptation to take a few dollars out of the company’s deep
pockets. 247 Such a bias, of course, is unlikely to benefit policyholders once ex ante effects are
taken into account. Such bias will result in contracts that rely on bright- line rules rather than
more flexible standards, as long as juries are more willing to take advantage of the latter than to
ignore the former. 248 In addition, such bias increases the price of insurance, forcing policyholders
to obtain more comprehensive policies than they otherwise might choose and worsening adverse
selection of a more traditional kind. With mandatory alienation, by contrast, a jury’s decision
will have no immediate effect on the policyholder or on the insurance company, and there is no
245
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inherent reason for the jury to favor one party over another. The jury thus may seek simply to do
its job by interpreting the contract without preference.
The premise in this argument is that a court will be more likely to arrive at the best
answer to a legal dispute when the decision will not directly affect any of the parties to that
dispute. This may be counterintuitive, because achieving a just result between the parties is
presumably high among the concerns that a court maximizes. 249 The original parties to a dispute
will not be affected if they have already transferred their rights and obligations to a third party. In
effect, the litigation for them will have already been completed, and only third parties will be
involved. This, however, does not mean that judges and juries will be unconcerned with justice.
To the contrary, judges and juries will still be concerned with achieving justice, but the transfer
of claims to third parties means that they will be concerned only with the precedential effect of
their decisions broadly conceived, not with economic redistribution between the original parties.
Any sympathy for an individual party, when in tension with the requirements of law and the
demands of public policy, will be tempered by the recognition that the party will not be affected
directly. Thus, if juries care at all about the ex ante benefits of fostering an environment in which
contracting parties can expect their agreements to be honored, they are less likely to be biased in
interpreting such agreements when their decisions will have immediate effects only on claim
purchasers.
If the post-alienation trials that occur in a mandatory alienation regime eliminate certain
biases, then competitive forces should prevent such biases from affecting claim prices. 250 For
mandatory alienation to be justified, however, the market must not only resolve legal claims
without bias, but it also must resolve them relatively accurately. 251 That is, the prices at which
claims are alienated must be sufficiently close to their underlying value to advance the goals of
the legal system. The principal impediment to an efficient market is the same as with a regime in
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which alienation is optional: asymmetric information. Litigants may have a great deal of
information about their cases, while third parties have less. If there is a mandatory alienation
requirement, asymmetric information will not prevent a market from forming, but it could result
in sale prices differing from the amount that a plaintiff would receive if permitted to take the
case to court.
Suppose, for example, that buyers had no information whatsoever about the legal claims
that they were purchasing. Then, even supposing that this total absence of information did not
lead to the filing of frivolous complaints, 252 every plaintiff would receive the same amount of
money, regardless of the strength of the plaintiff’s claim. A plaintiff who broke a toenail would
be treated the same as one who lost an arm. 253 If a goal of the legal system is to provide plaintiffs
compensation for their injuries, this would be unacceptable. Similarly, with alienation for
defendants, if defendants were able to find third parties to assume the burden of litigation
independent of the strength of particular claims, the deterrence function of tort law would be lost.
Whatever the goals of the legal system, as long as these goals require payments and awards that
reflect the underlying merits of claims, a mandatory alienation regime will be inadequate if
market prices fail to reflect distinctions that would emerge at trial.
Complete indifference to distinctions among claims would not result, however, because
plaintiffs alienating claims would have incentives to share information with third parties. At the
least, a plaintiff will have an incentive to share with a third party any information that would
make the third party tend to believe that the claim is more valuable than other claims. Thus, a
plaintiff with an unusually severe accident would be eager to make a physician’s report available
to a defendant. Moreover, once it is in the interest of some plaintiffs to make available
information, other plaintiffs would have an incentive to do so as well, lest buyers conclude that
they are hiding information. The more plaintiffs that make available information, the more other
plaintiffs will have an incentive to make available information as well. They might do so not
only by spontaneously producing documents, but also by responding to third parties’ requests for
information. While this unraveling effect might not lead every plaintiff to reveal every relevant
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document, economists have recognized that the dynamics of such markets may make relying on
the information of interested parties a relatively efficient procedure. 254
The information that third parties acquire will not necessarily be all the information that
might be relevant to making a decision about how much a claim is likely to be worth. For one
thing, plaintiffs seeking to alienate their claims might commit fraud, by fabricating documents,
giving false statements about the events pertinent to the lawsuit, or withholding relevant
documents while claiming to have produced them. 255 It might seem that private contractual
arrangements could serve as an effective deterrent to fraud. Plaintiffs, for example, might bond
their claims by agreeing to pay any damages attributable to information not released. The
problem is that such agreements undercut the mandatory alienation regime, because they would
leave the original litigants exposed to the risk of litigation. A claim sale with a warranty is in
effect not a complete sale of the claim. If the courts were to enforce agreements between the
original litigants and claim purchasers, they would need to do so carefully to ensure that the
agreements are not simply a mechanism by which parties opt out of the mandatory alienation
requirement.
Fraud, however, need not be a greater problem in this context than in any other market.
Companies planning to merge engage in due diligence by searching each other’s files for
relevant information, and presumably some form of such due diligence would occur in a
mandatory alienation regime as well. There is always a danger of elaborate frauds that will
deceive even a careful buyer, but there is no reason to fear that such fraud would be pervasive.
As long as there remains the possibility of criminal sanctions, alienators will ha ve incentives to
limit their sales pitches to spin rather than lies. This is, of course, what keeps our existing legal
system honest, or at least from moving too far in the other direction. A mandatory alienation
regime merely transfers the time at which there is an incentive to fabricate or withhold evidence.
If penalties for fraud in the legal claims market were as severe as those for perjury at trial, the
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claims market should be no more likely to reward deceit or punish its absence than our existing
legal system.
Placing fraud aside, there remains a separate problem; third parties might not be able to
access information in the possession of the adversaries of those whose claims they seek to
purchase. Defendants might choose to cooperate with prospective purchasers of a plaintiff’s
claim, however. By doing so, they might discourage a third party from buying a claim by
convincing the third party that it has no merit. Even where litigation is inevitable, a defendant
might share some of its evidence because it worries that a claim purchaser will be particularly
hesitant to settle a claim at a loss. 256 A defendant also might cooperate with prospective
purchasers, because it might hope that the prospective purchasers will choose to buy the
defendant’s claim rather than the plaintiff’s. Indeed, it seems likely that prospective purchasers
would consider buying claims from either side, given that the costs of researching one potential
transaction will be small after having researched the other. Some defendants, however, might
nonetheless choose not to cooperate with prospective purchasers of plaintiffs’ claims, and vice
versa. A plaintiff, for example, might insist that a potential buyer not have contact with the
defendant, especially if the plaintiff intends to reveal information that could be useful in
surprising the opponent at trial.
Let us suppose that, in a particular case, a third party must rely entirely on the
information in the plaintiff’s possession to evaluate the claim, retaining the assumption that the
plaintiff is not deliberately misleading the third party. Would this produce excessively inaccurate
results? There is a strong argument that it would not. Lack of information effectively serves an
insurance function. Imagine two plaintiffs who sustained identical serious illnesses after
participating in a medical experiment, and suppose each plaintiff knows that the defendant has in
its possession information indicating that the defendant’s negligence caused one of the plaintiff’s
illnesses, but neither knows which one. If risk-averse, the plaintiffs presumably would wish to
agree to share the award that one will receive. Restrictions on claim alienation in our existing
legal system might preclude this, and the facts in the real world are rarely sufficiently stark to
make such contracts possible. But paying off plaintiffs in proportion to the probability that their
injuries would prove to be attributable to a defendant’s negligence is a way of completing such a
256
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hypothetical contract. 257 The mandatory alienation system thus can be seen as one that
compensates tort plaintiffs for the wrongful losses that they have incurred, but then redistributes
compensation to create an insurance scheme based on the uncertainty of information unavailable
to the plaintiff. 258
This defe nse is limited, however, because a litigant may have unverifiable information
about information that is in the possession of an adversary. For example, one of the plaintiffs in
the above hypothetical might know from personal recollection that the defendant was negligent
and that a videotape in the defendant’s office is likely to prove it. If claim purchasers cannot
verify the existence of the videotape before formal discovery, the plaintiff will not receive as
much compensation as the plaintiff’s informatio n would suggest is deserved. The mandatory
alienation process thus cannot claim to achieve results that are accurate as to all information in
the possession of the litigant whose claim is being alienated. Information that a litigant knows
but cannot prove to third parties absent discovery would not be adequately factored into claim
prices.
Of course, it is possible to imagine a mandatory alienation regime that allowed for some
discovery. One approach would be to require alienation only after discovery has occurred. A
problem with this approach is that it would often be more efficient for a claim to be transferred at
an early stage. An adverse selection problem, however, might beset any attempts to transfer
claims before discovery, as litigants who fear that discovery will tend to undermine their claims
would be most likely to seek to alienate their claims early. If claims are alienated only just before
trial, many of the benefits of alienation, such as allowing plaintiffs to receive damages early and
encouraging consolidation of related claims for discovery, would be lost. Perhaps a compromise
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would be to allow limited discovery before alienation, 259 so that a litigant could seek to obtain the
information that it believes is most likely to be useful, especially information that the litigant
already knows exists. Even with such a compromise, the information that claim purchasers have
would not be as extensive as the information that later would materialize should a case go to
trial, but at least it would ensure that litigants could obtain verification of knowledge for which
they otherwise would not have proof.
A mandatory alienation regime thus could be expected to achieve a level of accuracy
approaching that obtained by trial, but if it is to be appealing relative to a world of trial, it must
reduce the cost of litigation. Indeed, third parties are likely to prosecute litigation more
efficiently than the original parties. The economic account of settlement suggests that the identity
of the parties litigating a claim should not matter, because whether settlement occurs is a
function of the parties’ estimates of the expected award and the cost of litigation. Yet in a
litigation universe in which the vast majority of cases settle, many of the few cases that don’t
settle may reflect litigant obstinance and collateral consequences of litigation as much as
financial calculation. Third parties that buy legal claims will have strong incentives to settle the
claims, for ongoing litigation will decrease the third parties’ profits. Moreover, third parties
might be better positioned to agree to forms of alternative dispute resolution, for example, by
entering into multilateral agreements to resolve a wide variety of claims through such channels.
Even in the absence of such agreements, third parties that face each other in a number of lawsuits
might achieve economies of scale and promote settlement by negotiating the various claims
together. 260
The alienation process itself, however, might be costly. It might seem initially that those
who alienate legal claims are saved the cost of litigating cases, but of course they pay for
litigation costs indirectly, with plaintiffs alienating claims receiving less for their claims and
defendants paying more to alienate their claims because of postalienation litigation costs.
Whether these costs are lower or higher than actual litigation costs would have been depends on
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the third parties’ efficiency in resolving claims. Adoption of a mandatory alienation regime,
however, does not simply lead to litigation costs being paid early in a lump sum, because such a
regime entails additional costs. For a claim purchaser to make a profit, the claim purchaser’s
initial costs of researching a claim also must be compensated, and this expense too will be passed
onto the original parties. Indeed, in a competitive market, the alienating party will be forced to
pay not only for the research costs of the purchaser of the claim, but also for an amount
equivalent to the research costs for all third parties that considered purchasing the claim. This is
because claims buyers must cover their costs not only for investigations that ultimately lead to
claims purchases, but also for investigations that fail to lead to such purchases, because some
other third party ends up offering a better deal. 261
The total cost of mandatory alienation will depend in part on the complexity of the issues.
The more complex the case, the more difficult it will be to value a claim. Third parties seeking to
maximize their profits will spend money on investigating claims until the marginal cost of doing
so exceeds the marginal benefit. With greater uncertainty, the marginal benefit of increased
investigation will be higher, because there is some chance that further investigation, whether the
investigation is of a legal issue or a factual one, will lead to a substantial change in an estimation
of the probability of the claim’s success. As this analysis indicates, not all types of uncertainty
are of equal significance. If a claim is seen as having a fifty percent chance of prevailing, but
additional information seems unlikely to change that estimate, then little money will be invested
in investigating the claim. The types of cases in which uncertainty is generally seen as greatest,
those in which the outcome will depend on a subjective application of the law to a particular set
of facts, may not be those in which uncertainty is likely to be most costly in a mandatory
alienation regime. Indeed, cases dependent on analysis of rules or precedents may have more
uncertainty in the relevant sense, if the rules or precedents are sufficiently complex that a
preliminary analysis could reach an incorrect answer. 262
The costs of the mandatory alienation process will also be higher, the greater the number
of potential purchasers. More third parties means a lower probability that any one will ultimately
be able to purchase the claim and thus greater research costs are passed along to the original
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parties in the form of less attractive deals. Indeed, the total amount of research could be in excess
of a social optimum, as the marginal benefit to a third party of engaging in additional research
might be greater than the marginal social benefit of the additional accuracy this will ensure.
Moreover, much of the research undertaken could be redundant, with each third party
independently forced to learn about the lawsuit and conduct appropriate research. The situation is
analogous to the stock market, in which the total amount of research conducted may be above the
social optimum, because a trader who can identify mispricing can profit the entire amount of the
mispricing, even though the social value of research in terms of ensuring efficient allocation of a
marginal dollar of social resources is considerably less than a dollar. 263 Not only may we end up
with too much stock market research, but also much of that research is redundant.
The market for legal claims would likely develop responses to these inefficiencies,
however, in the mandatory alienation context. 264 A firm, for example, with a reputation for
offering fair prices might enter into an arrangement in which a plaintiff would have to reimburse
its research costs if the plaintiff rejects the firm’s eventual offer. 265 Indeed, different third parties
might offer different tradeoffs between cost and accuracy in assessing claims, and thus the
original parties might be able to choose how important accuracy is to them, with greater accuracy
coming at a higher price. Similarly, a plaintiff or a defendant that believes it would benefit from
competitive offers could agree to communicate with only a small number of third parties, with
more competition again coming at a higher price. The cost of redundant research is thus likely to
be low and to exist only when an original party decides that the benefits of redundancy exceed
the costs. 266 In addition, any research that the third party that eventually purchases the claim
conducts is not wasted, as the third party can then use that information in the subsequent
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litigation. Even though research costs ultimately will be paid by the original parties, the research
costs by the third party that purchases the claim may lead to reduced litigation costs. Thus, the
only significant costs from researching claims will be costs attributable to those who do not
eventually buy the claims, and the market should be efficient in keeping such costs relatively
low.
Even this is an overstatement of the costs of the mandatory alienation approach, however,
because the creation of the market will reduce search costs and agency costs. In the existing legal
regime, those who wish to sue, and those who find themselves the unfortunate recipients of a
legal complaint, must find lawyers. One can find a lawyer quickly, for example, by seeking a
reference from a local bar association. 267 Lawyer quality, however, is difficult to measure, 268 and
consumers of legal services may spend time choosing among different possible representatives,
considering factors including education, past success, and fee structure. Of course, litigants may
simplify their search by relying on proxies, including the size of a firm’s advertisement in the
telephone directory or the beauty of a firm’s offices. 269 Efforts by law firms to make themselves
seem more attractive should count in search costs too, for part of such expenses are surely passed
along to clients. 270 Moreover, proxies can be misleading, and litigants may sometimes make poor
choices in selecting lawyers. The lawyers may not be the best ones to handle the particular type
of claim—perhaps not competent eno ugh, perhaps too expensive—or they might not be
sufficiently loyal to their clients, pursuing their own interests at their clients’ expense.
The creation of a mandatory alienation regime would not eliminate search costs, but it
could reduce them significantly. Litigants would still need to contact potential purchasers of their
claims and if they desired to limit the number bidding on their claims, would need to do some
research on the purchasers. But, once the field is narrowed down to a small number, the largest
bid is all the litigant needs to know. Law firms will have incentives to determine what types of
claims they are best suited to handle, with the market directing higher quality legal services to
267
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cases with greater complexity and greater stakes. Suc h bidding is not possible in a legal system
that makes legal claims inalienable, 271 and it may be impractical in an alienation-optional regime.
Moreover, the alienation of legal claims largely eliminates agency costs, 272 because the
purchasers will have appropriate incentives to balance the costs of legal expenses with their
benefits in terms of increasing or decreasing the expected judgment. Because litigants pay for
agency costs either in the form of higher legal fees or lower judgments, their elimination may
offset or even surpass the costs of a mandatory alienation regime. Thus, a mandatory alienation
regime may be particularly advisable in contexts where agency and search costs are high.
The ultimate comparison, of course, is an uncertain one, and only an experimental
mandatory alienation program could potentially reduce these uncertainties. My purpose,
however, is not to argue that a mandatory alienation regime would be superior to the existing
regime, but merely to show that such a regime is more attractive from an economic perspective
than one might expect. The ultimate point, though, is that a world in which voluntary alienation
becomes quite common despite adverse selection problems might be an attractive one indeed. If
sufficiently common, a decision to alienate legal claims would carry little negative informational
value, and the litigant could expect compensation that reflects at least information in the
litigant’s possession about the value of the claim. The principal potential drawbacks of the
mandatory alienation regime are the danger that a litigant would be forced to alienate a claim
despite unverifiable knowledge, or the danger that a litigant would alienate a claim even when
the expense of the alienation process is relatively high, but these would not be concerns in a
voluntary alienation regime that somehow overcomes adverse selection. The analysis of Part II
suggests that this may be a pipe dream, but if it is a pipe dream come true, economists should
have little complaint.
B. Noneconomic Considerations Revisited
1. Commodification
The analysis above of whether commodification theory would disapprove of claim
alienation was divided into two questions: first, whether alienation was corrosive of personhood;
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and second, whether an individual should be allowed to trade personhood for other goods. 273 The
second inquiry no longer presents a possible escape when alienation is mandatory, so focus on
the first is sufficient . If resolution of claims by a judge or jury is important to the personhood of a
litigant, then the removal of any possibility of such resolution may be relevant. Although pretrial
resolutions of cases, whether involuntarily made by judges or voluntarily made by mutual
consent, suggest that formal resolution in court cannot be a requirement if our judicial system is
to be justified; the possibility of such resolution is another matter. In our existing legal system, a
litigant who states a valid claim (or defense) and can survive summary judgment has the right to
a trial. Perhaps this right is important not only to the personhood of those who exercise it, but
more broadly also to litigants who settle. A claim that a lawsuit isn’t about the money becomes
far less plausible when the contingent right to trial is lost, 274 even to a litigant who would accept
a settlement in lieu of an authoritative judicial resolution that directly would have impacted the
parties. If the ability plausibly to make such a claim, or at least to convince oneself that a lawsuit
is not about the money, is important to personhood, then mandatory alienation poses a greater
threat to personhood than permissive alienation.
I do not mean to imply that mandatory alienation necessarily will impinge on
personhood. The claim is not an a priori philosophical one, but rather a contingent emp irical one.
The empirics depend both on economics and psychology. After all, if the argument in Section
III.A is correct, then a regime of mandatory alienation might be quite successful at pricing
claims, and perhaps such success would bring a perception of legitimacy, and this perception of
legitimacy in turn would provide an alternate foundation for, or defense of, personhood.
Moreover, commodification is possible only because mandatory alienation may prevent someone
from pursuing personhood by filing or defending a lawsuit. Mandatory alienation, however,
might have the reverse effect. Someone who otherwise might not be able to afford a lawsuit
might now be able to initiate a claim, and someone who could not afford to defend one alone
now might find someone else who is willing to do so. In addition, mandatory alienation may
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provide an opt-out mechanism that adverse selection otherwise would make practically
unavailable. Such an opt-out mechanism could preserve personhood if litigation itself could be
destructive of it. Such a possibility requires little philosophical imagination, for if it is plausible
that individuals define themselves through litigation, then it also is plausible for litigation to
threaten self-definition.
Perhaps the strongest argument that commodification brought by mandatory alienation
threatens the legal system would focus not on the litigants themselves, but on the societal
perception of the legal system. Charles Nesson has argued that our legal system seeks to impose
appropriate behavioral messages by convincing the public that judgments are about what
happened, rather than about the evidence of what happened. 275 This argument has serious flaws
as positive analysis, 276 but Nesson’s broader point, that legal form is relevant to the public’s
acceptance of the system as a whole, seems plausible. A system in which a few claims are sold,
or many claims are settled, seems unlikely to undermine that acceptance, for the right to proceed
to trial produces a backstop that remains visible. Perhaps mandatory alienation would remove
that backstop from public view, as trials that are only about the money and no longer include the
initial litigants would lack drama. Confidence in the legal system accordingly might decline, and
if such confidence is necessary to our individual, or at least to our shared, identity, fears of
commodification are well- grounded.
The difficult question is whether a regime permitting but not requiring alienation might
impinge on personhood if alienation became so common that pursuit of a claim to trial became
rare. If such pursuit was rare, it presumably would be because of its expense, and indeed
considerable expense likely would need to be attached to traditional trying of cases before the
adverse selection impediments to claim markets could be overcome. If that is so, there is an
argument that alienation, though voluntary, is coerced. 277 The meaning of coercion is
contested. 278 Consider, however, the following “first approximation” offered by David
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Zimmerman: “P coerces Q only if he changes the range of actions open to Q and this change
makes Q considerably worse off than he would have been in some relevant baseline situation.”279
Translated to a policy context, 280 a policy that gives an option might nevertheless be coercive if it
makes the recipient of the option worse off.
Permissive alienation might not be coercive under this definition because it is not the
option to alienate that coerces. Rather coercion results from any inherent flaws in the justice
system that makes alienation so relatively attractive. Once permissive alienation becomes
commonplace, however, there might be reduced pressure to ensure the feasibility of pursuing a
legal case to trial, just as the existence of plea bargaining may allow and indeed encourage
lawmakers to impose a more severe sentence on defendants who insist on trial than we would
accept in a world without plea bargaining. 281 Thus, adoption of a permissive alienation option
may indirectly be coercive if it substitutes for other forms of legal reform, as proponents have
advocated. 282 Permissive alienation also might indirectly prove coercive if alienation by many
stigmatizes the few who refuse to alienate, for example by leading jurors to mistake a litigant’s
tenacity for an indication that others thought the claim economically valueless. My point,
however, is not so much to conclude that permissive alienation would be coercive, let alone to
determine whether the benefits of permissive alienation would justify such coercion, but merely
to establish that commodification concerns that are absent when alienation is rare are greater
when it is common.
2. Corrective Justice
Voluntary alienation by a defendant of a claim does not offend corrective justice, because
nothing in corrective justice requires that a wrongdoer directly repair wrongful losses, instead of
indirectly repairing them, for example, through insurance. 283 Similarly, a plaintiff’s decision to
have wrongful losses rectified by a third party claim purchaser does not violate corrective justice,
because corrective justice is satisfied as long as wrongful losses are repaired, regardless of
279
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whether the wrongdoer directly pays for the loss. Similar arguments could be used to defend a
mandatory alienation regime, but these arguments would be weaker. A mandatory alienation
regime means that a wrongdoer will never directly rectify a victim’s loss, but the amount the
wrongdoer pays, and the amount the victim receives, will be indirectly related since both
amounts will reflect predictions of the same possible trial. 284 If we could be confident that
wrongful losses would be repaired, and that the market process imposed no new wrongful losses
by forcing payments by those wrongfully accused of wrongdoing, corrective justice would be
satisfied. The problem is that, at least in the absence of a discovery regime, the alleged
wrongdoer’s payment will depend only on evidence in the wrongdoers’ possession that third
parties can identify and verify, and the amount the victim receives will similarly depend only on
evidence in its possession.
I argued above that this need not be troubling from an economic perspective, and indeed
that asymmetric judgments may better advance economic objectives, because each side’s
outcome would not depend on the happenstance of information unknown to it. 285 Market
resolution, however, may be more troubling from a corrective justice standpoint, 286 because
corrective justice demands repair of the wrongful losses that a tortfeasor has caused and no other
losses. 287 One might still argue that mandatory alienation satisfies corrective justice by
emphasizing Coleman’s point that corrective justice requires “administrative rules establishing
burdens of proof and evidence.”288 If mandatory alienation is the system that best implements
corrective justice, even though each litigant’s outcome may be unaffected by information in the
other side’s possession, then mandatory alienation may satisfy corrective justice. One might
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argue, however, that a system that has an evidentiary framework that makes little effort to ensure
that all available evidence is considered does not “provide the best chance of practically
implementing corrective justice,”289 and, therefore, does not satisfy it even if it advances other
objectives.
To see the problem of one-sided evidence more clearly, consider a hypothetical from Leo
Katz, 290 based on the movie The Morning After:291 After a night of drinking that she no longer
remembers, a woman wakes up with a dead body and a gun with her fingerprints on it. A
prosecutor investigating the case would like to place her in jail for some time in any event,
because he suspects her of other crimes. It later turns out that there is a film of the events locked
in a safety deposit box. Should we allow the woman and the prosecutor to agree to a plea bargain
in which she will be charged with a lesser offense, with the film to be viewed only after the
bargain is complete? 292 Katz answers no, 293 because “whatever the evidence finally reveals, we
are 100 percent certain to regret our present decision to let the plea bargain go through, ” and a
“decision we are certain to regret a moment from now should presumably not be made.”294 Just
as the legal system should not tolerate this plea bargain, one might argue, it should not allow for
a plaintiff’s recovery or the defendant’s liability to be resolved based only on the information in
the possession of one party. If the legal system is obliged to open the safety deposit box, so too is
the legal system obliged to consult the other party’s evidence.
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Assume that Katz’s analysis is correct. 295 The difficult question is whether the argument
survives the translation from criminal law to tort law. 296 What the hypothetical labels as immoral
is not the defendant’s decision to accept the plea bargain, but the prosecutor’s offer of it. If we
change the hypothetical and suppose that the defendant, but not the prosecutor, has seen the tape,
the prosecutor’s decision to offer a plea bargain before seeing the tape seems just as troubling as
before. 297 (A smart prosecutor would not do this, because the defendant would accept the offer
only if the tape was incriminating, but this is beside the point; it would be immoral for even a
stupid prosecutor.) The prosecutor’s offer is immoral because the result is either that the tape will
show that the defendant did not commit the murder, and is thus effectively being punished for
other crimes that the government does not have evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, or
it will show that the defendant did commit the murder and is thus being punished insufficiently.
These failures to impose the retributively proper amount of punishment, 298 moreover, are
completely avoidable. The immorality is in the prosecutor’s forgoing of what the legal system
deems the best result based on a private suspicion that the legal system deems irrelevant.
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A public prosecutor must act in the best interests of society and not for the sole purpose
of maximizing penalties. A private litigant, however, is not so ethically restricted. Suppose that
we change the hypothetical in a different way, so that the woman wakes up next to an
unconscious victim of a battery who also has no memory of the circumstances, and the case is a
civil one between the woman and the victim. We would have little trouble with these parties’
resolving their differences without seeing the tape, agreeing with each other that whatever
happened, it is best to move on and to compromise. The victim does not act morally wrongly in
deciding that some compensation for his injury is better than none and that he does not want to
risk the possibility that the tape identifies someone else (perhaps someone who is judgment
proof) as the culprit. That the victim could assure the “correct” outcome by insisting on viewing
the tape does not make the decision not to do so wrong, because the victim is bargaining away
his own rights. As long as we do not conceive of retribution as a purpose of the civil law, 299 a
decision by private parties not to seek out the truth seems quite different from a similar decision
by a prosecutor in a criminal matter, and the justification for the court’s refus al to honor the
agreement disappears.
Even so, a requirement that parties alienate their claims is different, because the decision
to alienate in such a regime is not voluntary. The criminal law hypothetical thus may be more
applicable than the civil law one. A system that seeks to achieve corrective justice cannot
decouple defendants’ duties and plaintiffs’ rights even if most plaintiffs and defendants would
agree in a hypothetical contract to such decoupling because it serves an insurance function.
Corrective justice demands that defendants repair wrongful losses that they have caused, not
wrongful losses that they think they might have caused, and it demands the repair of plaintiffs’
wrongful injuries, not just those injur ies that appear to be wrongful based on information in the
plaintiffs’ possession. Of course, as I argued above, 300 a voluntary disclosure or a partial
discovery regime could allow much evidence in others’ possession to affect the prices at which
claims are alienated. If so, such discovery might be enough to make a mandatory alienation
regime the best way of implementing corrective justice. Unlike the economist who balances
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benefits and costs, however, the advocate of corrective justice would not tolerate a significant
cost in achieving corrective justice merely because there are offsetting economic benefits if
corrective justice could be achieved better through some other regime. 301 Of course, the case that
corrective justice is satisfied might be easier when the regime in question is a permissive
alienation regime in which alienation becomes common. The issue of coercion once again would
become critical, 302 but corrective justice remains at least more problematic if alienation is
common, rather than rare.
3. Legal Ethics
A statute instituting mandatory alienation in some contexts presumably would raise no
technical ethical problems. Either the statute explicitly could permit lawyers to purchase claims,
trumping any existing rules, or it could prohibit lawyers from purchasing claims, in which case
purchasers of claims would need to hire lawyers independently. Mandatory alienation, however,
would further erode lawyer-client relationships and would thus accentuate concerns like
Kronman’s. 303 It is possible that some clients alienating claims would hire a lawyer to assist in
their presentations to potential claim purchasers, but many clients might choose to forego the
expense, recognizing that a competitive bidding process would give the bidders incentives to
obtain the relevant information. The problem would be less severe with a permissive alienation
regime in which alienation is common, but any amount of alienation would weaken lawyer-client
ties. If alienation becomes the norm, many litigants might never hire lawyers, and without legal
advice, they would take what they could receive, but the legal system would be less
comprehensible. Whether or not this represents a substantial cost, widespread alienation makes
more serious problems that seem modest when alienation is rare.
4. Procedural Justice
That mandatory alienation is more likely than permissive alienation to threaten litigants’
psychological perceptions of procedural justice is straightforward. A regime that permits
alienation increases the options available to litigant s and thus presumably increases litigants’
301
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ability to control the process. Mandatory alienation removes this option and, therefore,
necessarily decreases process control, even if mandatory alienation conceivably might provide
more process control than an inalienability regime. Mandatory alienation is particularly
worrisome in a lawsuit in which a finding or admission of wrongdoing or innocence is as
important to the litigants as any money involved, because a process that necessarily reduces to
money may prove unsatisfying. Parties that will not alienate because they care about something
other than the direct financial consequences of the judgment are differently situated from those
who would alienate their claims but for the existence of the lemons problem. Even if every other
litigant in the world alienated claims, for example, a newspaper concerned more about its
reputation than about money might prefer to keep control over a libel litigation, either directly or
indirectly.
Even parties that would prefer not to alienate their claims for nonfinancial reasons,
however, conceivably could benefit from a mandatory alienation regime, as long as that regime
required both parties to alienate their claims. Often, in a litigation where one party cares about
the result for reputational as well as financial reasons, the other party will be concerned about
nonfinancial factors as well. In such a case, the total amount that the parties spend on litigating
the case would be greater than the financial stakes would warrant. The increased spending might
increase the accuracy of the adjudication, which one or both parties ex ante might favor. In many
cases, however, the litigation expenses will be largely offsetting, and a mandatory alienation
regime might provide an indirect way of binding both parties to spend an amount on litigation
proportional to the financial stakes. This is principally an economic benefit, but it also improves
procedural justice one, because a less expensive litigation may allow both parties to retain
process control.
There will, however, be cases in which one party cares more about the reputational
implications of the case than the other. Many such cases will settle, as the party that places more
value on whether there is an admission of wrongdoing gives financial concessions in exchange
for a favorable resolution of this issue. 304 Some such cases, however, will not settle, for example,
because the defendant takes the position that it will not pay a cent or admit any wrongdoing. 305
304
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The interest of the litigant s who care about more than financials in such asymmetrical
reputational stakes cases may argue against a mandatory alienation regime, because mandatory
alienation deprives such litigants of autonomy in controlling the lawsuit. The legal system
plausibly is concerned not just with money, but also with reputation, both in absolving civil
defendants accused of wrongdoing, and in condemning those who are guilty of wrongdoing.
Forcing alienation may interfere with this function, particularly if third parties ent er into a
settlement that does not send a clear message about the relevant decision. 306
Thus, both in cases that are solely about money and in cases in which one or both
litigants cares about the expressive effect of the court’s judgment, 307 mandatory alienation may
decrease process control and prevent litigants from pursuing their goals through the legal system.
Similarly, one might argue that a permissive alienation regime in which litigants generally decide
to alienate their claims because of the heavy cost of litigation effectively removes an option, at
least relative to a permissive alienation regime in which trial is economically more feasible. The
difficult comparison for procedural justice is between a permissive alienation regime in which
alienation is common and an inalienability regime, especially if the reason that alienation
becomes common is that the permissive alienation regime makes trial less attractive, for
example, because the need to maintain trial as an economically feasible option declines. In such
a case, alienability arguably does not enhance the options of litigants, but changes them, and the

newspaper might arrange a settlement in which it admits no wrongdoing, or a newspaper might refuse even a nominal settlement
on the basis of principle. Cf. William Glaberson, ‘60 Minutes’ Case Part of a Trend of Corporate Pressure, Some Analysts Say,
N.Y. T IMES, Nov. 17, 1995, at B14 (noting that many news organizations have backed away from past strategies of vigorously
fighting all libel cases). It would be quite odd to have a settlement in which the newspaper paid money and the plaintiff admitted
that the newspaper story was accurate, as the payment of money would seem to undermine the agreed-upon declaration of
accuracy.
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comparison depends on whether the market or trials are more successful at promoting procedural
justice. 308
The balance may depend on how frequent trial would be in an inalienability regime. If
hearings for deprivation of welfare benefits are frequently held and are successful in instilling
feelings of procedural justice, 309 then a switch to a permissive alienation regime may thwart
procedural justice. Arguably, this is so even if hearings are no less convenient and available than
before. That litigants may be willing to accept immediate payment over the chance to tell their
story does not mean that a system that allows them to do so necessarily provides greater
procedural justice. If, however, hearings are inconvenient and rare in the inalienability regime
and claimants routinely settle with the government before any hearings, then a regime of
permissive alienability, by giving claimants an option other than settlement, may increase
litigants’ options and thus litigants’ process control. A procedural justice evaluation of an
alienability regime, therefore, depends not only on whether such a regime coerces litigants,
assuming that it does at all, but also on how much coercion would exist in an inalienability
regime.
IV. CONCLUSION

It is common to conclude theoretical inquiries about legal procedure with a
recommendation for further empirical work. I will not do so. Further legislative and judicial
developments could mean the elimination of barriers to alienation in one or more jurisdictions,
and such an experiment would help test this Article’s prediction that robust markets for claims
will not develop. But resolution of this prediction will not be sufficient to determine the
acceptability of alienation. If this Article’s prediction is accurate, only occasional alienations
would result, and while the net costs might exceed the net benefits, as long as alienation is rare,
the total effects are likely to be small. If this Article’s prediction is wrong, for example, because
claim purchasers can litigate cases so efficiently that the adverse selection obstacle is overcome,
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the economic concerns about claim alienation disappear. If the theories underlying the
noneconomic concerns are accepted, however, then the noneconomic concerns would be
weightier and conflicting, but the experiment would be unlikely to help assess these concerns or
determine how to weigh them against the incommensurate economic benefits.

